People v. Winkler, 74 N.Y.2d 704 (1989)
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on a contingent fee arrangement requires a hearing to determine if the fee arrangement actually prejudiced the defendant’s representation.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order for a new trial, reinstating the original judgment. The court held that the Appellate Division erred in finding ineffective assistance of counsel based on a contingent fee arrangement without first holding a hearing to determine if the fee agreement prejudicially impacted the attorney’s representation. The case was remitted for a hearing on the defendant’s CPL article 440 motion to determine whether the contingent fee arrangement affected counsel’s decisions.
Facts
Defendant Winkler was convicted. He moved to set aside the verdict, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney had worked under a contingent fee agreement. The Appellate Division initially granted the motion without a hearing.
Procedural History
The Court of Appeals initially reversed the Appellate Division’s order, which had granted the motion to set aside the verdict without a hearing (People v. Winkler, 71 NY2d 592). The Court of Appeals remanded the case. On remand, the Appellate Division again ordered a new trial, finding that the fee arrangement prejudicially impacted counsel’s representation (144 AD2d 404, 405). The People appealed this decision.
Issue(s)
Whether the Appellate Division properly granted the defendant’s motion for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel due to a contingent fee arrangement, without first conducting a hearing to determine if the fee arrangement prejudiced the defendant’s representation.
Holding
No, because there was no concession by the People or unquestionable documentary proof that trial counsel’s decisions were affected by the contingent fee arrangement, a hearing was required to determine whether the contingent fee arrangement affected counsel’s decisions.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that a contingent fee arrangement, by itself, does not automatically constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Following its prior decision in People v. Winkler, 71 NY2d 592, the court reiterated that a conviction can only be set aside if the defendant demonstrates that the contingency fee agreement “affected the manner in which his attorney conducted the defense prejudicially to the defendant.” The court found that the Appellate Division erred in ordering a new trial without first holding a hearing to determine if the contingent fee arrangement actually prejudiced the defendant’s representation. The court emphasized the absence of a concession from the prosecution or conclusive documentary proof that counsel’s decisions were affected by the fee arrangement. The decision underscores the need for a factual inquiry to establish a causal link between the fee arrangement and the alleged ineffectiveness of counsel, and prevents decisions made without sufficient justification.