New York Law Review

People v. Sedore, 71 N.Y.2d 661 (1988): Indictment Must Not Charge a Duplicitous Time Period for a Single Offense

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People v. Sedore, 71 N.Y.2d 661 (1988)

An indictment is duplicitous and may be dismissed if it alleges a single act offense occurring repeatedly over an unreasonably long period, hindering the defendant’s ability to prepare a defense.

Summary

The New York Court of Appeals held that an indictment charging the defendant with multiple counts of sodomy, sexual abuse, and rape was duplicitous because the bill of particulars alleged a “continuous course of conduct” over nine months for each count. The court also found the time period (excluding weekends) was unreasonably excessive, making it difficult for the defendant to prepare a defense. The court modified the Appellate Division’s order, reversing convictions on counts 15, 16, and 17, and dismissed those counts with leave for the People to resubmit the charges to another Grand Jury.

Facts

The defendant was indicted on multiple counts of sodomy, sexual abuse, and rape. The alleged criminal conduct was said to have occurred over a period exceeding nine months (October 31, 1983, to August 1, 1984, excluding weekends). Prior to trial, the defendant moved to dismiss all counts, arguing duplicitousness due to the excessive time frame.

Procedural History

The defendant was convicted in the trial court. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. The defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the indictment was duplicitous and that the time period alleged was unreasonably excessive. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order, reversing convictions on some counts and dismissing them with leave to resubmit to a grand jury.

Issue(s)

1. Whether an indictment is duplicitous when the bill of particulars alleges a continuous course of conduct over a long period for single-act offenses?

2. Whether the time period alleged in the indictment (October 31, 1983-August 1, 1984, excluding weekends) was so excessive as to warrant dismissal of the charges?

Holding

1. Yes, because each count of an indictment may charge only one offense, and alleging a continuous course of conduct violates this principle.

2. Yes, because the time period was so large that it was virtually impossible for the defendant to answer the charges and prepare a defense.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that under CPL 200.30[1] and 200.50[3], each count of an indictment must charge only one offense. The bill of particulars specified that the defendant had engaged in a “continuous course of conduct” over more than nine months for each count, rendering the charges duplicitous. The court rejected the application of a

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