People v. Lynn, 75 N.Y.2d 510 (1990)
CPL 710.30 notice requirements for prior identifications do not apply to judicially supervised identifications, like those in prior trials or Wade hearings, where the defendant is represented by counsel.
Summary
Lynn was convicted of robbery. A prior trial ended in a hung jury. On appeal, he argued the prosecution improperly introduced evidence of a prior identification without proper notice under CPL 710.30 and improperly introduced post-arrest statements after initially agreeing not to use them. He also claimed the Appellate Division erred in refusing his request to file a supplemental pro se brief. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding CPL 710.30 doesn’t apply to in-court identifications and the admission of the statements, while error, was harmless. The Court also held that there is no right to hybrid representation on appeal.
Facts
Edgar Berry, 63, was robbed in his apartment building’s vestibule on March 5, 1981. Berry recognized Lynn, who he had seen around the building. Lynn was arrested four days later and denied involvement, claiming “two other guys” committed the robbery. At the first trial, which ended in a mistrial, Berry identified Lynn as the robber. Before the second trial, the People stated their intent to use Lynn’s post-arrest statements, which they initially said they would not use, claiming the statements were voluntary.
Procedural History
Lynn and his brother were indicted for robbery. After initial suppression motions regarding post-arrest statements, the prosecution initially stated they would not use the statements at trial. The first trial resulted in a hung jury. Prior to the second trial, the People changed course and indicated they would use Lynn’s statements. The trial court denied a motion to preclude the statements after a Huntley hearing. Lynn was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed without opinion. Lynn appealed, arguing the introduction of prior identification evidence, the post-arrest statements, and the denial of his request to file a pro se brief were errors.
Issue(s)
1. Whether the requirements of CPL 710.30 apply to judicially supervised identifications occurring when the defendant is represented by counsel.
2. Whether the prosecutor’s initial decision not to introduce Lynn’s statement constituted a stipulation preventing its later use.
3. Whether the Appellate Division erred in refusing to allow Lynn to file a supplemental pro se brief.
Holding
1. No, because the purpose of CPL 710.30 is to provide notice of pretrial identifications that the defendant might not otherwise be aware of, and this concern is not present when the identification occurs in court with counsel present.
2. Yes, because the prosecutor’s statement constituted a stipulation under CPL 710.60(2)(b); however, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the statement was largely exculpatory, and the victim’s identification was strong.
3. No, because a defendant has no state or federal constitutional right to hybrid representation on appeal.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court reasoned that the legislative intent behind CPL 710.30 was to address concerns about suggestive pretrial identification procedures. “CPL 710.30 sets forth a procedure to provide notice to a defendant who might otherwise be unaware that the People are in possession of such evidence and thus allows the defendant to test the reliability of the identification before trial.” However, in prior in-court identifications, the defendant is aware of the identification, and counsel is present to challenge any suggestiveness. A separate hearing would therefore be redundant.
Regarding the post-arrest statements, the Court found that the prosecutor’s initial statement constituted a stipulation under CPL 710.60(2)(b). A stipulation is “ ‘[a]n agreement, admission, or concession made in a judicial proceeding by the parties thereto or their attorneys, in respect of some matter incident to the proceeding, for the purpose, ordinarily, of avoiding delay, trouble and expense’ ”. However, the error in admitting the statements was deemed harmless because the statements were primarily exculpatory and the victim’s identification was strong.
Finally, the Court rejected Lynn’s argument that he had a right to file a supplemental pro se brief. The Court stated, “We have previously held that a defendant has no State or Federal constitutional right to such representation at the pretrial and trial levels…”. The Court clarified that its prior decision in People v. Vasquez (70 N.Y.2d 1) addressed the ethical obligations of counsel but did not create a right to hybrid representation. While the Court suggested that appellate courts should generally accept timely pro se briefs, the decision remains within the court’s discretion.