73 N.Y.2d 208 (1989)
Under New York Penal Law § 70.25(2), consecutive sentences are permissible when offenses arise from separate and distinct acts, and when the statutory definition of one crime does not include the other as a material element.
Summary
Defendant Day was convicted of attempted grand larceny, criminal possession of stolen property, and criminal possession of a forged instrument. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences for the attempted grand larceny conviction, arguing it was a separate crime. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the offenses were separate acts and that the possessory crimes were not material elements of the attempted larceny. The court clarified that for sentencing purposes, one offense is a material element of another only if the statutory definition of the second crime includes the first as a necessary component.
Facts
Day, a precious metals broker, received checks worth approximately $221,000 from an associate. These checks, originally payable to the “City Collector,” had been stolen and the payee altered to “Intercity Collector’s Ent. Inc.” Day deposited the checks into his company’s account. The checks were discovered to be stolen, and Day was arrested while attempting to withdraw the account’s balance.
Procedural History
Day was convicted in the trial court of attempted grand larceny, criminal possession of stolen property, and criminal possession of a forged instrument, and received consecutive sentences for the larceny conviction. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court erred in imposing a consecutive sentence for attempted grand larceny, arguing that the crimes of conviction were part of the same act or that the possessory offenses were material elements of the attempted grand larceny, thus violating Penal Law § 70.25(2).
Holding
No, because the criminal actions constituted more than a single act, and the possessory counts do not constitute material elements of the larceny count according to the pertinent statutes.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals relied on Penal Law § 70.25(2), which mandates concurrent sentences for offenses committed through a single act or when one offense is a material element of another. Citing People ex rel. Maurer v. Jackson, the court stated that punishment for separate and distinct acts violating multiple Penal Law sections is permissible, even if arising from a single transaction. The Court emphasized that for sentencing purposes, a material element exists only if the statutory definition of one crime necessarily includes the other. The court reasoned that the possessory offenses (possessing stolen property and forged instruments with intent) are distinct from attempted grand larceny (attempting to steal property over a specified amount). "[T]he commission of one offense is a material element of a second for restrictive sentencing purposes if, by comparative examination, the statutory definition of the second crime provides that the first crime is also a necessary component in the legislative classification and definitional sense." Since the statutes define these crimes separately, consecutive sentences were permissible. The court also noted that factual interdependence is a discretionary factor for the sentencing court to consider when deciding whether to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences. The court stated, ” ‘The test is not whether the criminal intent is one and the same and inspiring the whole transaction, but whether separate acts have been committed with the requisite criminal intent’ ”.