Lago v. Krollage, 78 N.Y.2d 95 (1991)
A release of liability signed by a volunteer providing services at a recreational facility is enforceable under General Obligations Law § 5-326 if the volunteer is not considered a “user” of the facility within the meaning of the statute.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a release of liability signed by a volunteer at a car racetrack was void under General Obligations Law § 5-326. The plaintiff, a volunteer firefighter and ambulance crew member, was injured at the racetrack and had signed a waiver releasing the owner-operators from liability. The Court held that the release was enforceable because the plaintiff was not a “user” of the facility as contemplated by the statute, despite providing volunteer services that could be considered “other compensation” to the owner. The plaintiff’s presence was solely for providing emergency services, not for recreational use.
Facts
The plaintiff was a member of a volunteer fire and ambulance crew. He was injured at a car racetrack while serving in that capacity. The plaintiff paid no fee to enter the racetrack. Prior to entering the pit area, the plaintiff signed a waiver and release of liability for any injury sustained while in the restricted area.
Procedural History
The Supreme Court granted partial summary judgment to the defendants (the owner-operators), holding that General Obligations Law § 5-326 did not void the release because the plaintiff was not a “user” of the raceway. The Appellate Division granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment in its entirety, concluding that since General Obligations Law § 5-326 did not void the release, there were no issues of fact left to be tried, and the defendants were entitled to a dismissal of the lawsuit. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal.
Issue(s)
Whether the release signed by the plaintiff is void under General Obligations Law § 5-326, given that he was a volunteer providing services at the racetrack and did not pay a fee for admission.
Holding
No, because the plaintiff was not a “user” of the facility within the meaning of General Obligations Law § 5-326, even though he provided volunteer services, as he was at the raceway solely to work as a member of the volunteer fire and rescue squad.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals focused on whether the plaintiff was a “user” of the recreational facility within the meaning of General Obligations Law § 5-326. The statute voids agreements exempting owners or operators from liability when a fee or other compensation is paid for the use of a facility. The Court acknowledged that the plaintiff’s volunteer services could be considered “other compensation” paid to the owner-operators. However, the court emphasized that the plaintiff was at the raceway solely to work as a member of the volunteer fire and rescue squad, not to use the facility for recreational purposes. The Court stated: “Here, notwithstanding plaintiffs execution of the release agreement itself and the ‘other compensation’ paid to the owner-operators in the form of his volunteer services, plaintiffs cause is nevertheless barred by the release because plaintiff was not a ‘user’ of the facility within the meaning of the remedial statute as a matter of law.” Because the plaintiff was not a “user” as contemplated by the statute, General Obligations Law § 5-326 did not apply to void the release. The court found that under these specific circumstances, the statute has no effect on the validity of the release. The Appellate Division’s rationale was deemed unduly restrictive for limiting the statute’s application only to instances involving admission tickets, but the ultimate outcome was affirmed nonetheless.