People v. Williams, 66 N.Y.2d 602 (1985)
r
r
It is legally impossible to attempt to commit a crime where the completed crime does not require a specific intent as to the prohibited result (e.g., injury), even if another element of the crime requires intent.
r
r
Summary
r
Defendant was convicted of attempted assault in the second degree under Penal Law § 120.05(3) for allegedly injuring police officers while resisting arrest, with the intent to prevent them from performing their lawful duty. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that attempted assault in the second degree under this statute is a legal impossibility. Because the statute imposes strict liability for the injury caused so long as the defendant intended to prevent the officer from performing a lawful duty, one cannot have the specific intent to cause an unintended injury, which is required for the crime of attempt.
r
r
Facts
r
Two police officers arrested Defendant on an attempted rape charge.
r
While being arrested, Defendant allegedly caused physical injury to the officers.
r
Defendant was indicted on several charges, including two counts of assault in the second degree (Penal Law § 120.05[3]).
r
r
Procedural History
r
At a non-jury trial, the Defendant was acquitted of second-degree assault but convicted of two counts of attempted assault in the second degree, despite his objection.
r
The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
r
The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and then reversed the attempted assault convictions.
r
r
Issue(s)
r
Whether a person can be convicted of attempted assault in the second degree under Penal Law § 120.05(3), when that section imposes criminal responsibility for an unintended injury?
r
r
Holding
r
No, because an attempt to commit a crime requires a specific intent to bring about the result proscribed by the statute, and Penal Law § 120.05(3) does not require intent to cause the injury, only intent to prevent a peace officer from performing a lawful duty.
r
r
Court’s Reasoning
r
Penal Law § 120.05(3) states that a person is guilty of assault in the second degree when, with the intent to prevent a peace officer from performing a lawful duty,