People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227 (1974)
A defendant is not entitled to specific performance of a plea agreement if they have not detrimentally relied on the agreement, even if no new facts emerged to justify the court’s change of heart regarding the sentence.
Summary
Defendants pleaded guilty based on a judge’s sentencing indication, but the judge later deemed a harsher sentence appropriate. Although the defendants were allowed to withdraw their pleas, they instead sought specific performance of the original agreement. The New York Court of Appeals held that, absent detrimental reliance on the plea agreement, the defendants were not entitled to specific performance because vacating the plea restores them to their original position. The court retains sentencing discretion until the moment of sentencing, provided that the reasons for departing from the agreement are documented.
Facts
The defendants entered guilty pleas after the County Court Judge indicated a likely sentence. Prior to sentencing, the Judge reconsidered the nature of the crime and determined that a lengthier sentence was warranted.
Procedural History
The defendants appealed, seeking specific performance of the original plea agreement, arguing that no new facts justified the judge’s change in sentencing. The Appellate Division orders were affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether a defendant is entitled to specific performance of a plea agreement when the sentencing court decides to impose a harsher sentence than initially indicated, but allows the defendant to withdraw their plea, and the defendant has not demonstrated detrimental reliance on the original agreement.
Holding
No, because absent detrimental reliance on the plea agreement, the defendant is restored to their original position by being allowed to withdraw the plea, and the court retains discretion in fixing an appropriate sentence until the time of sentencing, as long as the reasons for departing from the sentencing agreement are placed on the record.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals relied on People v. McConnell, which stated that a defendant who has not changed their position is generally only entitled to the vacation of their plea if the court cannot adhere to the promise given. This is because vacating the plea restores them to their initial position. The court emphasized that it retains discretion in fixing an appropriate sentence up until the time of sentencing, citing People v. Farrar. The court also noted that reasons for departing from the sentencing agreement must be placed on the record to ensure effective appellate review, citing People v. Danny G. Because the defendants were afforded an opportunity to withdraw their pleas, didn’t argue detrimental reliance, and the County Court demonstrated proper sentencing criteria for the revised sanction, the Court of Appeals held that the County Court had not abused its discretion as a matter of law. The court stated that the defendants are not entitled to specific performance of the original sentencing representations. The court emphasized that “[a] defendant who has not * * * changed his position will generally be entitled to no more than the vacation of his plea if the court concludes that it cannot adhere to the promise given, for the simple reason that vacating the plea restores him to the same position he was in before the plea was taken”. This highlights the court’s focus on restoring the defendant to their original position absent detrimental reliance.