Gray v. Adduci, 73 N.Y.2d 742 (1988)

Hearsay evidence is admissible in administrative hearings and can be the sole basis for an administrative determination, provided it is sufficiently relevant and probative.

Summary

This case addresses the admissibility of hearsay evidence in administrative hearings, specifically regarding a driver’s license revocation for refusing a chemical test. The Court of Appeals held that the arresting officer’s written report, even though hearsay, was sufficient evidence to support the administrative law judge’s determination that the driver refused the test after being warned of the consequences. The court emphasized that the driver had the right to subpoena the officer for cross-examination and that the burden was on the driver to ensure the officer’s presence at the hearing.

Facts

Petitioner Gray was arrested for driving under the influence. The arresting officer requested that Gray submit to a chemical test to determine his blood alcohol content. The officer claimed that Gray refused to take the test after being warned of the consequences of such refusal. At the administrative hearing regarding the revocation of Gray’s driver’s license, the officer did not appear. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) admitted the officer’s written report into evidence.

Procedural History

The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles revoked Gray’s license based on the ALJ’s determination. Gray appealed, arguing that the determination was based on inadmissible hearsay and that he was denied his right to cross-examine the officer. The Appellate Division reversed the Commissioner’s determination. The Commissioner then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

1. Whether hearsay evidence, specifically the arresting officer’s written report, is admissible in an administrative hearing regarding driver’s license revocation for refusing a chemical test.
2. Whether the Commissioner’s determination was made in violation of the State Administrative Procedure Act § 306 (3), and of petitioner’s right to due process due to the lack of cross-examination.

Holding

1. Yes, because hearsay evidence can be the basis of an administrative determination if it is sufficiently relevant and probative.
2. No, because petitioner had the right to call the officer as a witness and failed to do so.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals held that hearsay evidence is admissible in administrative hearings. The Court cited precedent, including People ex rel. Vega v. Smith, stating that hearsay can form the basis of such determinations. The arresting officer’s report was deemed sufficiently relevant and probative to support the ALJ’s finding that Gray refused the chemical test after being warned of the consequences. The court noted the quantum of evidence was substantial since a reasonable mind could accept the report as adequate to support a conclusion. The Court emphasized that Gray had the right to subpoena the officer to appear for cross-examination under the State Administrative Procedure Act § 304 (2) and that the burden was on Gray to ensure the officer’s presence. The court stated, “Petitioner always had it within his power to subpoena the officer at any time.” The Court found that Gray’s failure to subpoena the officer was a tactical decision and not a denial of due process. It distinguished the case from situations where a party is actively prevented from exercising their right to cross-examine. The court reasoned that even though the ALJ had adjourned the hearing on prior occasions due to the absence of the police officer, this inconvenience cannot be determinative as a matter of law. The court also stated Gray’s sole objection voiced was on hearsay grounds and he never claimed that he had been misled, prejudiced or biased by the Judge’s actions.