72 N.Y.2d 1014 (1988)
For purposes of Public Officers Law § 30(1)(e), which mandates automatic termination of a public officer upon felony conviction, a ‘felony’ refers to offenses that would constitute a felony under New York law.
Summary
David Graham, a correction officer, was terminated after being convicted of a federal felony for aiding and abetting mail fraud. He challenged his termination, arguing the federal crime would only be a misdemeanor under New York law. The Court of Appeals affirmed the termination, but disagreed on the rationale. The majority held that Public Officers Law § 30(1)(e) encompasses any felony in any jurisdiction. However, a concurring opinion argued that the federal crime was equivalent to a New York felony, and that the statute should only apply when the out-of-state crime would also be a felony in New York.
Facts
David Graham, a correction officer, was charged with one count of mail fraud as an aider and abettor under federal law. He pled guilty and was convicted of the federal felony. Subsequently, Graham was discharged from his position as a correction officer under Public Officers Law § 30(1)(e), which mandates automatic termination upon conviction of a felony.
Procedural History
Graham challenged his discharge via an Article 78 proceeding, arguing that the crime for which he was convicted would only constitute a misdemeanor under New York law. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of Graham’s petition. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.
Issue(s)
Whether the term “felony” in Public Officers Law § 30(1)(e) encompasses any felony conviction in any jurisdiction, or whether it is limited to offenses that would constitute a felony under New York law.
Holding
Yes, the order is affirmed because the federal crime that Graham was convicted of, would also constitute a felony under New York law. However, the court affirmed the lower court ruling that Public Officers Law § 30(1)(e) encompasses any felony in any jurisdiction.
Court’s Reasoning
The majority of the court, in line with the Appellate Division’s reasoning, held that Public Officers Law § 30(1)(e) mandates automatic termination upon conviction of a felony, regardless of whether the offense would constitute a felony under New York law. They emphasized that the Legislature had not amended the Public Officers Law to conform with a 1979 amendment to the Judiciary Law § 90(4)(e), which defined “felony” as either a New York felony or an out-of-state felony that would also be a felony in New York. They view this as a statutory policy choice for the Legislature.
Judge Hancock, in concurrence, argued that the federal crime Graham was convicted of – aiding and abetting mail fraud – was substantially similar to insurance fraud in the fourth degree under New York Penal Law § 176.15, a Class E felony, because it required a sharing in the principal’s fraudulent intent. Hancock disagreed with the majority’s interpretation that the statute encompasses any felony in any jurisdiction. He argued that the statute should only trigger automatic termination when the out-of-state crime would also amount to a felony under New York law. Hancock highlighted that the Legislature overruled prior case law (Matter of Chu and Matter of Thies) that broadened the definition of “felony” in the context of attorney disbarment, amending the Judiciary Law to reflect the traditional view that a “felony” should be defined with reference to New York law. He argued that similar reasoning should apply to the Public Officers Law.
Hancock further reasoned that the purpose of Public Officers Law § 30(1)(e) is to ensure the integrity of New York’s public officers and should only be triggered by crimes that the New York Legislature deems sufficiently egregious to be classified as felonies. He noted the lack of uniformity among jurisdictions as to which offenses are considered felonies, and argued it makes little sense to incorporate every felony of other jurisdictions into Public Officers Law § 30(1)(e). He argued that the Legislature should act to correct what he views as an unfair interpretation of the statute.