66 N.Y.2d 307 (1985)
A trial judge’s instruction to a deadlocked jury to “continue to deliberate,” delivered through a court officer outside the presence of the defendant and counsel, constitutes an improper delegation of judicial duty requiring reversal.
Summary
Ahmed was convicted on narcotics charges. After jury deliberations began, the jury sent a note indicating an impasse. The trial judge, presiding over another matter in a different county, directed a court officer to instruct the jury to “continue to deliberate” without informing the attorneys or the defendant, and without recording the interaction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the trial judge improperly delegated a judicial duty to a nonjudicial staff member during a critical stage of the proceedings, effectively conducting trial proceedings in the judge’s absence.
Facts
Defendant was tried in Kings County on narcotics-related charges.
After the case was submitted to the jury, the trial judge left the courthouse to preside over a matter in Queens County.
During the judge’s absence, the jury sent a note indicating it was deadlocked and unable to reach a verdict.
The trial judge was informed of the jury’s note by telephone.
The trial judge directed a court officer to tell the jury to “continue to deliberate.”
The trial judge directed the court officer to advise defense counsel of the jury’s note.
Neither the attorneys nor the defendant was present when the court officer spoke to the jury.
The court officer’s remarks were not recorded.
Procedural History
Defendant was tried and convicted in Kings County.
The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial.
Issue(s)
Whether a trial judge’s instruction to a deadlocked jury to “continue to deliberate,” delivered through a court officer outside the presence of the defendant and counsel, constitutes an improper delegation of judicial duty requiring reversal.
Holding
Yes, because the trial judge improperly delegated a judicial duty to a nonjudicial staff member at a critical stage of the proceedings and thus permitted trial proceedings to be conducted in his absence.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals held that instructing a deadlocked jury to continue deliberations is not a mere “ministerial” matter. Such an instruction carries significant weight and is a judicial function that cannot be delegated to a court officer. The court relied on the principle that a defendant has a right to be present during critical stages of the trial, including jury instructions, to ensure a fair trial. The court emphasized the importance of the judge’s presence and supervision during jury deliberations, especially when the jury indicates difficulty in reaching a verdict. The absence of the judge and the unrecorded communication between the court officer and the jury created an unacceptable risk of prejudice to the defendant. The court cited People v Ahmed, 66 NY2d 307 in support of its reasoning, stating that delegating judicial duties to nonjudicial staff during critical stages of the proceedings is impermissible. The Court reasoned that such delegation compromises the integrity of the trial process and potentially prejudices the defendant’s right to a fair trial. The court noted that any communication with the jury regarding its deliberations should be conducted in open court, in the presence of the defendant and counsel, and should be properly recorded. This ensures transparency and allows for proper review on appeal. Failure to adhere to these procedures constitutes reversible error. As the Court explicitly stated, reversal is required because the “Trial Justice improperly delegated a judicial duty to a nonjudicial staff member at a critical stage of the proceedings and thus permitted trial proceedings to be conducted in his absence”.