New York Law Review

Matter of County of Cayuga v. Cuomo, 73 N.Y.2d 94(1989): Interpreting “Forthwith” in Prisoner Transfer Statutes

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Matter of County of Cayuga v. Cuomo, 73 N.Y.2d 94 (1989)

The term “forthwith” in CPL 430.20(1), which governs the transfer of inmates from county jails to state correctional facilities, means “without delay,” and does not grant the State discretion to postpone accepting state-ready inmates based on relative overcrowding between state and local facilities.

Summary

Forty-nine county sheriffs brought an Article 78 proceeding against the Commissioner of the State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS), seeking to compel DOCS to accept state-ready prisoners from county jails within 48 hours and to expedite parole violation proceedings. The sheriffs argued that DOCS’s delays, driven by state prison overcrowding, violated CPL 430.20(1), which mandates that a defendant be committed to the appropriate public servant “forthwith” upon sentencing. The Court of Appeals held that “forthwith” means “without delay” and that DOCS does not have the discretion to delay accepting inmates due to overcrowding. The Court reinstated the Supreme Court’s order requiring DOCS to accept inmates within ten days of notification of state-readiness.

Facts

Due to overcrowding in state prisons, DOCS had a policy of delaying the acceptance of inmates from county jails, sometimes for extended periods. This delay led to overcrowding in county jails, impacting the health, welfare, and safety of inmates and staff. The sheriffs alleged that delays in parole revocation proceedings further exacerbated the issue, with alleged parole violators remaining in county jails for months.

Procedural History

The sheriffs initiated an Article 78 proceeding in Supreme Court, seeking to compel DOCS to accept state-ready prisoners promptly. The Supreme Court ordered DOCS to accept inmates within ten days of notification of state-readiness and restrained the State Commission of Correction from enforcing “minimum standards” regulations when overcrowding resulted from the presence of state-ready inmates. The Appellate Division modified this order, concluding that the Supreme Court lacked the authority to set a specific time period for acceptance and that restraining enforcement of minimum standards was inappropriate. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division order by reinstating the Supreme Court’s judgment regarding the meaning of “forthwith.”

Issue(s)

1. Whether the term “forthwith” in CPL 430.20(1) allows DOCS discretion to delay accepting state-ready inmates based on overcrowding in state facilities.

2. Whether the Supreme Court had the authority to order DOCS to accept prisoners within ten days of notification of state-readiness.

3. Whether the sheriffs have standing to challenge the timeliness of parole revocation proceedings.

Holding

1. No, because the statutory mandate to commit individuals to the responsible officials “forthwith” means without delay, at once, promptly, and does not allow for discretion based on relative overcrowding.

2. Yes, because setting a ten-day limit comports with the mandate of CPL 430.20(1) and aligns with DOCS’s representation that its logistic needs require ten days’ notice.

3. No, because the statutory procedures for parole revocation were designed to protect parolees, not sheriffs, and give the sheriffs no role in the scheduling or conduct of hearings.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court emphasized that “forthwith” signals immediacy and must be accomplished with dispatch. It reiterated its prior holdings in Crespo v. Hall and County of Nassau v. Cuomo, which established that “forthwith” means “without delay” and does not permit discretion based on perceived prudence. The Court rejected the Commissioner’s argument that the issue could only be resolved after a court analyzes the circumstances in each locality, determines which facilities are overcrowded, and prioritizes the allocation of space. The Court stated, “The Legislature did not provide for transfer to State custody in the Commissioner’s discretion…it said ‘forthwith.’” While acknowledging some limited flexibility for exigent circumstances, the Court held that evaluating the relative capacity of state and local facilities would effectively reallocate the state’s responsibility to the localities. The Court found that the Supreme Court’s order of transfer within ten days of state-readiness appropriately balanced the mandate of CPL 430.20(1) with DOCS’s logistical needs. Finally, the Court affirmed the lower courts’ finding that the sheriffs lacked standing to challenge parole revocation proceedings, as those procedures were designed to protect parolees.

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