Purdy v. Public Administrator of County of Westchester, 72 N.Y.2d 1 (1988)

Absent a special relationship creating a duty to control a third party’s conduct, neither a health-related facility nor its physician owes a duty of care to an unidentified member of the public to prevent a voluntary resident from operating a motor vehicle off the premises, even if the resident has a medical condition that could impair their driving ability.

Summary

This case addresses the scope of duty owed by a health-related facility and its physician to the general public concerning the actions of a voluntary resident. The plaintiff was injured when struck by a car driven by Shaw, a resident of Bethel Methodist Home, who blacked out due to a medical condition. The court held that neither Bethel nor its physician, Dr. Argenziano, owed a duty to the plaintiff to prevent Shaw from driving or to warn her against it. The court emphasized that Shaw was a voluntary resident with the right to make independent decisions, and no special relationship existed that would impose a duty to control her actions for the benefit of the plaintiff.

Facts

Emily Shaw, a 73-year-old woman with a history of strokes and fainting spells, was a voluntary resident at Bethel Methodist Home. Dr. Argenziano, Bethel’s medical director, authorized Shaw to leave the facility unaccompanied. Dr. Argenziano did not inquire whether Shaw owned a car, knew how to drive, or intended to drive while residing at Bethel. Shaw blacked out while driving and struck the plaintiff, who was at a gas station. The plaintiff sued Shaw, Bethel, and Dr. Argenziano, alleging negligence in failing to prevent Shaw from driving.

Procedural History

The trial court initially entered a jury verdict apportioning liability among Shaw’s estate, Bethel, and Dr. Argenziano. The trial judge then set aside the verdict for Bethel and Dr. Argenziano, concluding there was no proximate cause. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that neither defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

Issue(s)

1. Whether Bethel Methodist Home owed a duty to the plaintiff, a member of the general public, to prevent Shaw, a voluntary resident, from operating a motor vehicle off the premises, given her known medical condition.
2. Whether Dr. Argenziano, as Bethel’s medical director and Shaw’s admitting physician, owed a duty to the plaintiff to prevent Shaw from driving or to warn her of the dangers of driving given her medical condition.

Holding

1. No, because Shaw was a voluntary resident with the right to make independent personal decisions, and Bethel lacked the authority to control her actions outside the facility absent an emergency.
2. No, because Dr. Argenziano was not Shaw’s treating physician and therefore had no duty to warn her of the dangers of driving; furthermore, there was no evidence that Shaw’s driving impairment was due to medication he prescribed without appropriate warnings.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reiterated the general common law principle that there is no duty to control the conduct of third persons to prevent them from causing injury to others, unless a special relationship exists. The court found no special relationship between Bethel and Shaw that would give rise to such a duty. Shaw was a voluntary resident who could come and go as she pleased. The court cited Public Health Law provisions protecting the rights of voluntary residents to make independent decisions and exercise civil liberties. Regarding Dr. Argenziano, the court distinguished this case from those where physicians have a duty to warn patients about the adverse effects of medication on driving, noting that Dr. Argenziano was not Shaw’s treating physician. The court quoted Eiseman v. State of New York, 70 N.Y.2d 175, 188, stating that a physician does not “undertake a duty to the community at large” merely by examining a patient. The court emphasized that imposing a duty in this case would create an unwarranted expansion of liability, especially considering Shaw’s status as a voluntary resident with the right to make her own choices. The court affirmed the importance of individual autonomy and the limitations on imposing control over the actions of others absent a clear legal basis or special relationship.