People v. Love, 71 N.Y.2d 711 (1988)
An unconstitutionally obtained conviction cannot be used to extend the 10-year statutory period for determining predicate felony status, even if the defendant was incarcerated during that time due to the invalid conviction.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a prior, unconstitutionally obtained conviction could be used to extend the 10-year look-back period for determining if a defendant is a second felony offender. The defendant, convicted of robbery in 1982, had a prior conviction from 1968. The prosecution sought to use a 1972 conviction, later deemed unconstitutional, to toll the 10-year limit. The Court held that the unconstitutional conviction could not be used, directly or indirectly, to enhance punishment. It reasoned that the statutory scheme provides an integrated approach, and an unconstitutional conviction cannot be “counted” towards predicate felony status.
Facts
The defendant was convicted of grand larceny in 1968 and released from prison on January 12, 1971.
In 1972, the defendant pleaded guilty to assault and was imprisoned, being released on September 26, 1975. This 1972 conviction was later found to be unconstitutionally obtained due to ineffective assistance of counsel.
In 1982, the defendant was convicted of robbery. The prosecution initially sought to sentence him as a second felony offender based on the 1972 assault conviction.
After the 1972 conviction was vacated, the prosecution attempted to use the 1968 grand larceny conviction as the predicate felony, arguing that the time the defendant was incarcerated for the unconstitutional 1972 conviction should toll the 10-year statutory limit.
Procedural History
The trial court initially sentenced the defendant as a second felony offender based on the 1972 conviction.
The defendant successfully moved to vacate the sentence, arguing that the 1972 conviction was unconstitutional.
Prior to resentencing, the prosecution filed a new information seeking to classify the defendant as a second felony offender based on the 1968 conviction, using the 1972 incarceration period to toll the 10-year limit.
The trial court rejected the prosecution’s argument and resentenced the defendant as a first felony offender.
The Appellate Division affirmed.
Issue(s)
Whether an unconstitutionally obtained conviction can be used to extend the 10-year statutory period for determining predicate felony status by tolling the limitations period due to incarceration resulting from that unconstitutional conviction?
Holding
No, because the statutory scheme does not allow an unconstitutionally obtained conviction to be “counted” when determining predicate felony status, either directly or indirectly through tolling provisions.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals emphasized that CPL 400.21 (7) (b) states that a previous conviction obtained in violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights “must not be counted in determining whether the defendant has been subjected to a predicate felony conviction.” The Court reasoned that the 10-year limitations period and the exception for periods of incarceration are criteria used to determine whether a prior conviction qualifies as a predicate felony. The Court highlighted that the statute doesn’t simply say that an unconstitutional conviction cannot *serve* as the predicate felony but that it cannot be *counted* in determining whether a prior conviction meets the standard. The Court stated, “Contrary to the People’s contention, a ‘predicate felony conviction’ and the 10-year period with its exception for periods of incarceration are not independent concepts which should be separately considered and evaluated.”
The Court found that the statutes provide an integrated legislative scheme, and all factors must be considered together. “Reading the statutes in that light, it is clear that the 1968 conviction does not qualify because the 10-year limitation period had run when the defendant committed the current offenses, and it cannot be extended by taking into account the incarceration on the 1972 conviction since that conviction was unconstitutionally obtained. In short, when the statute says that incarceration ‘for any reason’ extends the limitations period, it contemplates at least that the defendant has not been imprisoned without reason or unconstitutionally.”