St. Onge v. Donovan, 71 N.Y.2d 507 (1988)

A zoning board may impose conditions on a variance, but those conditions must relate to the use of the land itself, not to the identity of the owner or operator of the property.

Summary

This case addresses the validity of conditions imposed on zoning variances. The New York Court of Appeals held that zoning boards can only impose conditions that relate to the use of the land, not to the specific owner or operator. Two separate cases were consolidated for appeal: In one, a variance was improperly restricted to a specific business owner; in the other, a variance was conditioned on ceasing operations at a separate, legally pre-existing business location. The Court invalidated the conditions as improperly targeting the individuals involved rather than the land use itself, and upheld the condition limiting the number of cars parked outside the business.

Facts

St. Onge: Petitioners contracted to buy property to operate a real estate business, which required a variance. The prior owners had been granted a variance in 1977 to operate their real estate business, but the variance contained a condition that it was “to be used solely by the applicants.” The Planning Board denied site plan approval, citing the personal nature of the 1977 variance. Driesbaugh: Petitioner owned two auto body repair shops, one a legal nonconforming use and the other not. After being cited for operating the second shop in violation of zoning, the petitioner applied for a variance. The Zoning Board granted the variance but imposed conditions, including limiting the number of non-employee vehicles outside and requiring the phasing out of the first shop.

Procedural History

St. Onge: Special Term annulled the Zoning Board’s determination, holding the personal condition void. The Appellate Division reversed, requiring a de novo application. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal. Driesbaugh: Supreme Court annulled two of the conditions imposed by the Zoning Board. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

Issue(s)

1. Whether a zoning board may impose conditions on a variance that restrict the variance to a specific owner or operator of the property?

2. Whether a zoning board may condition a variance for one property on the cessation of operations at a separate, legally pre-existing business location owned by the same individual?

3. Whether a zoning board may impose conditions that regulate the details of the operation of an enterprise, rather than the use of the land?

Holding

1. No, because conditions imposed on zoning variances must relate to the use of the land, not to the person who owns or occupies it.

2. No, because such a condition is unrelated to the use of the land subject to the variance and improperly infringes on the owner’s rights.

3. No, because such conditions do not ameliorate the effects of the land use at issue and are thus unrelated to the legitimate purposes of zoning.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court relied on its prior decision in Matter of Dexter v. Town Bd., stating that conditions on zoning changes must be reasonable and relate only to the real estate involved, irrespective of ownership. The Court emphasized that zoning should focus on land use and not on the individual using the land, quoting Matter of Dexter v Town Bd., 36 NY2d, at 105: “[A] lack of adherence to the fundamental rule that zoning deals basically with land use and not with the person who owns or occupies it.” Permissible conditions relate to fences, safety devices, landscaping, access roads, noise, odors, etc. Impermissible conditions include requiring dedication of land not subject to the variance or regulating operational details. In St. Onge, the condition restricting the variance to the original applicants was a personal condition, violating the rule in Dexter. In Driesbaugh, requiring the phasing out of the Port Crane location was similarly improper as it concerned a separate property. However, the condition limiting the number of cars parked at the Route 7 shop was valid because it related to the impact of the land use on the neighborhood character. The Court noted that the power to zone is not unlimited and should not result in an arbitrary infringement of property rights. The Court distinguished between excising an invalid condition and remanding for reconsideration, concluding that because it was established that the requirements for a variance were satisfied in each case, Supreme Court appropriately excised the unlawful conditions in each case. However, it reinstated the car parking limitation, holding that that condition was a valid exercise of the zoning board’s discretion.