People v. Bright, 71 N.Y.2d 376 (1988)
A loitering statute is unconstitutionally vague if it (1) fails to provide adequate notice of the prohibited conduct, (2) permits arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by law enforcement, and (3) compels a citizen to forfeit their right against self-incrimination to avoid arrest.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals held that Penal Law § 240.35(7), which criminalized loitering in transportation facilities for those unable to provide a satisfactory explanation for their presence, was unconstitutionally vague. The court reasoned that the statute failed to provide fair notice of prohibited conduct, lacked minimal guidelines for enforcement, and infringed on the right against self-incrimination. The statute’s broad definition of “transportation facility” further contributed to its vagueness, encompassing areas akin to public streets. This decision affirmed the lower courts’ rulings in two separate cases, impacting law enforcement’s ability to address loitering in public transportation hubs.
Facts
People v. Bright: Bright was observed in the Long Island Railroad Concourse in Pennsylvania Station displaying a satchel to a passerby. When questioned by police, he stated he had no ticket or money and wasn’t planning to board a train. He failed to produce identification and was arrested for loitering. A subsequent search revealed stolen credit cards.
People v. Clark: Clark was approached by an officer in the Port Authority Bus Terminal and arrested for loitering after failing to provide a satisfactory explanation for his presence. A search incident to the arrest revealed cocaine and drug paraphernalia.
Procedural History
People v. Bright: The Supreme Court granted Bright’s motion to suppress evidence, finding the loitering statute unconstitutionally vague. The Appellate Division affirmed.
People v. Clark: The Criminal Court denied Clark’s motion to dismiss the loitering charge, and he pled guilty. The Appellate Term reversed, holding the statute unconstitutional, dismissing the loitering charge, and remanding for further proceedings on the drug possession charge.
The People were granted leave to appeal in both cases.
Issue(s)
1. Whether Penal Law § 240.35(7) is unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions.
Holding
1. Yes, because the statute fails to provide fair notice of what conduct is prohibited, lacks minimal guidelines for law enforcement, and requires citizens to relinquish their constitutional right against compulsory self-incrimination.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals analyzed the statute under the two-pronged vagueness test. First, a statute must provide sufficient notice of prohibited conduct. Second, it must not permit or encourage arbitrary enforcement. The court noted that a penal law must be sufficiently definite to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that contemplated conduct is forbidden.
The court distinguished between statutes prohibiting loitering for a specific illegal purpose or in a specific place of restricted public access, which have been upheld, and the current statute, which lacks such specificity. Quoting United States v. Harriss, the court stated, “that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed”.
The court found the “satisfactory explanation” requirement problematic, as it vested complete discretion in the police officer to determine what constitutes an acceptable explanation, without any legislative guidance. The court cited Kolender v. Lawson in stating that the statute provides “no standard for determining what a suspect has to do in order to satisfy the requirement”.
Furthermore, the court reasoned the statute compels a citizen to choose between providing an explanation and potentially incriminating themselves, or remaining silent and being arrested, which infringes on the right against self-incrimination. The court also found that the definition of “transportation facility” was overly broad, encompassing areas resembling public streets where loitering is not inherently suspicious. Therefore, it cannot be said that the ordinary citizen is fairly informed that an otherwise innocent act is illegal. As such, the statute provides no legislative “guidelines governing the determination as to whether a person is engaged in suspicious loitering” in public places.