Baker v. Board of Education, 70 N.Y.2d 314 (1987)
In New York, the six-year statute of limitations applies to actions by public sector employees against their unions for breach of the duty of fair representation, and a teacher’s resignation does not automatically divest them of a cause of action for such a breach if the resignation is effectively a constructive discharge.
Summary
A teacher, Baker, sued her union for failing to fairly represent her grievance after she resigned, claiming constructive discharge. The New York Court of Appeals addressed the statute of limitations for such claims and whether resignation negated the union’s duty. The Court held that the six-year statute of limitations applied, rejecting shorter federal or state alternatives. It also ruled that a constructive discharge claim allowed the teacher to sue the union for breaches occurring before her resignation, as if she had been wrongfully terminated. The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s dismissal, allowing the case to proceed.
Facts
Baker, a math teacher, requested an extension of her education leave to complete a master’s degree. Her request was denied. She then requested relief from certain administrative duties to continue her studies part-time, but this was also largely denied. She resigned, later learning that male teachers in similar situations had been granted leaves and relief. The union refused to represent her grievance, arguing that her resignation terminated their duty to represent her.
Procedural History
Baker sued the Board of Education and the union, alleging gender-based inequitable treatment and constructive discharge by the former, and breach of duty of fair representation by the latter. The union moved to dismiss the claim against it, arguing the claim was untimely, that they had no duty to represent her post-resignation, and failure to exhaust remedies. Special Term denied the motion, but the Appellate Division reversed, finding the federal six-month statute of limitations applicable and holding the union’s duty ceased upon resignation. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division decision.
Issue(s)
1. Whether the applicable statute of limitations for a public sector employee’s claim against their union for breach of the duty of fair representation is the federal six-month period, a 90-day period for vacating arbitration awards, a four-month period for PERB unfair labor practice charges, or the state’s six-year default statute of limitations.
2. Whether a union has a duty to represent a teacher who has resigned when the teacher claims the resignation amounted to a constructive discharge resulting from a breach of the collective bargaining agreement during employment.
Holding
1. No, because neither the Taylor Law nor the CPLR prescribes a specific statute of limitations, and until the Legislature acts, the six-year statute of limitations (CPLR 213[1]) applies.
2. Yes, because an employer cannot extinguish an employee’s rights under a collective bargaining agreement by terminating employment, and a claim of constructive discharge is premised on a breach of the agreement occurring during employment.
Court’s Reasoning
Regarding the statute of limitations, the Court reasoned that while the duty of fair representation originated in federal law, New York’s Taylor Law governs public sector employment, explicitly distinguishing it from private sector labor law. The Court rejected applying the federal six-month statute from DelCostello v. Teamsters, as well as the 90-day arbitration award challenge period and the four-month PERB rule, because they were not analogous. The Court determined that because no specific statute of limitations governed the action, the catch-all six-year period of CPLR 213(1) applied. The court acknowledged the policy concerns of a longer limitations period in labor disputes, urging the Legislature to address the issue.
Regarding the duty of fair representation, the Court distinguished Smith v. Sipe, noting that the case did not address the status of a former employee. The Court stated that an employer cannot extinguish an employee’s rights under a collective bargaining agreement simply by terminating employment. The court emphasized that Baker’s claim of constructive discharge meant she was, in effect, claiming a wrongful termination stemming from a breach during her employment. Therefore, her post-resignation status did not automatically absolve the union of its duty. The Court viewed Baker’s situation as analogous to an employee claiming wrongful discharge and therefore deserving of representation.
The Court also found that Baker had adequately attempted to exhaust her contractual remedies, thus negating the Union’s argument for dismissal on those grounds.