People v. Catten, 69 N.Y.2d 547 (1987)
A defendant waives double jeopardy protections by moving for a mistrial, and the trial court has discretion whether to allow withdrawal of that motion after it has been granted, but before the jury is discharged.
Summary
These consolidated cases address whether a retrial after a mistrial, declared over defense objection, violates double jeopardy when the defendant initially requested the mistrial. In Catten, the defendant sought to withdraw his mistrial motion after it was granted. In Murphy, the defendant’s mistrial motion was initially denied, and the court later granted a mistrial based on the prosecution’s motion on the same grounds, purportedly “on consent.” The Court of Appeals held that in Catten, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the withdrawal of the mistrial motion, while in Murphy, the retrial violated double jeopardy because the mistrial was declared without the defendant’s consent and without manifest necessity.
Facts
Catten: During a drug sale trial, an undercover officer testified about identifying the defendant in a lineup while wearing similar clothes to those worn during the sale. A backup officer later testified the defendant was allowed to change into street clothes before the lineup, and the outer clothing was removed at some point before identification. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, which was granted. He then attempted to withdraw the motion, but the court denied the request.
Murphy: During a manslaughter trial, a witness for the prosecution testified that Murphy offered her a jacket if she went to the back of his store with him. The defense motioned for a mistrial, which was denied. Later, the prosecutor requested a mistrial based on the same testimony, which the court granted. The defense attempted to withdraw the mistrial motion but was denied.
Procedural History
Catten: Following a retrial, Catten was convicted. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, holding the trial court erred in declaring a mistrial over the defendant’s desire to continue the trial.
Murphy: Murphy was convicted of manslaughter at the second trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
Issue(s)
1. In Catten, whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s request to withdraw his mistrial motion after it was granted but before the jury was discharged.
2. In Murphy, whether the retrial violated the defendant’s double jeopardy rights when the mistrial was declared after his initial motion was denied, and the court granted the mistrial based on the prosecution’s motion.
Holding
1. In Catten, No, because it is within the trial court’s discretion to deny withdrawal of a mistrial motion after it has been granted, and there was no abuse of discretion here.
2. In Murphy, Yes, because the mistrial was declared without the defendant’s consent and without manifest necessity, thus violating his double jeopardy rights.
Court’s Reasoning
Catten: The Court reasoned that once a mistrial motion is granted, whether to allow its withdrawal is within the trial court’s discretion, citing Matter of Napoli v. Supreme Ct. The trial court found that defense counsel had adequate time to discuss the motion with his client, undermining the proffered reason for withdrawal. The Court also noted that a defendant need not agree with counsel’s mistrial motion for it to be binding. Thus, the denial of the withdrawal request was not an abuse of discretion.
Murphy: The Court reasoned that the defendant’s initial mistrial motion was denied. When the prosecutor later moved for a mistrial (after the witness’s cross-examination testimony bolstered a justification defense) and the court granted it, the defendant possessed the right to have his trial completed by the current tribunal. Because the court had denied his original motion, there was nothing to withdraw, and the defendant registered an objection to the mistrial. The court abused its discretion by not considering a curative instruction, which has been held to preclude the mention of uncharged crimes from constituting reversible error (citing People v Santiago, 52 NY2d 865, 866). Since the mistrial was declared without consent or manifest necessity, retrial violated double jeopardy.
The Court distinguished other cases, noting that in those cases, the defendant did not object to the court’s ruling or attempt to withdraw their prior application on any ground. As the court stated, “appellate review in such situations would be facilitated if, immediately after a motion for mistrial is made and all parties are heard, the court clearly and unconditionally states its decision on the record.”