People v. Rodriguez, 76 N.Y.2d 918 (1990)
A defendant does not have a constitutional right to hybrid representation, where the defendant represents himself while also being partially represented by counsel.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s order, holding that a defendant does not have a right to a hybrid form of representation under either the Federal or State Constitutions. The defendant, who initially chose to represent himself with standby counsel, sought to have the standby counsel question him directly, which the court denied, offering him the choice between continued self-representation or full representation by counsel. The Court of Appeals found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s handling of the matter and rejected the defendant’s double jeopardy claim regarding a corrected sentencing error.
Facts
The defendant moved to represent himself (pro se), and the court granted the motion, appointing standby counsel to assist him if needed.
At the suppression hearing, the defendant’s standby counsel stated that the defendant wanted to testify.
The defendant then asked if he could not be questioned by the defense, implying he wanted his standby counsel to conduct the direct examination while he otherwise represented himself.
The court offered the defendant the choice of continuing his pro se defense or having standby counsel represent him fully for the remainder of the case but would not allow counsel to represent him solely for direct examination.
Procedural History
The Supreme Court granted the defendant’s motion to proceed pro se with standby counsel.
At the suppression hearing, a dispute arose regarding the extent of the defendant’s self-representation and the role of standby counsel.
The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision.
The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
1. Whether the trial court deprived the defendant of his right to counsel by refusing to allow standby counsel to question him on direct examination while he otherwise represented himself?
2. Whether the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibited the court from correcting its own sentencing error?
Holding
1. No, because a defendant has no constitutional right to hybrid representation.
2. No, because the court was correcting its own sentencing error, which is permissible.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals held that there is no right to a hybrid form of representation under either the Federal or State Constitutions, citing People v. Mirenda and United States v. Williams. The court emphasized that exercising the right to self-representation requires a waiver of the right to assistance of counsel, quoting United States v. Weisz, noting the exercise of right of self-representation requires “waiver of the preeminent right to the assistance of counsel”.
The court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s request, referring to People v. Mirenda and United States v. Klee. The court noted that it repeatedly advised the defendant of the dangers of pro se representation and gave him the opportunity to choose between self-representation and full representation by counsel. It further accommodated him by allowing him to testify in a narrative fashion.
The court also rejected the defendant’s double jeopardy argument, citing People v. Minaya, which permits a court to correct its own sentencing error. The court summarily dismissed the remaining contentions as either unpreserved or lacking merit.