Matter of Cruz v. Sheriff of New York County, 69 N.Y.2d 866 (1987)
The Double Jeopardy Clause precludes successive prosecutions for criminal possession of a weapon when the possession constitutes a single, continuing offense, even if the possession occurs in different locations over a short period.
Summary
Cruz was arrested in New York County for possessing a handgun six days after allegedly firing it in the Bronx. He pleaded guilty in the Bronx to a weapons charge. He then sought to dismiss the New York County indictment on double jeopardy grounds, arguing the possession was a single, continuous offense. The Court of Appeals held that unlawful possession is a continuing offense, and successive prosecutions for the same continuous possession violate double jeopardy. The court emphasized that the state cannot divide a single crime into multiple offenses based on time or location.
Facts
On February 5, 1985, Cruz fired a handgun at his sister in a Bronx apartment. Six days later, on February 11, 1985, he was arrested in New York County and found to be in possession of the same handgun. Both Bronx and New York Counties indicted him for criminal possession of a weapon. The Bronx indictment covered the February 5th possession, and the New York County indictment covered the February 11th possession.
Procedural History
Cruz pleaded guilty to attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the Bronx. He then moved to dismiss the New York County indictment based on double jeopardy. The motion was denied. Cruz then filed an Article 78 proceeding seeking to prohibit the New York County prosecution. The Appellate Division dismissed the petition. Cruz appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether the New York County indictment for criminal possession of a weapon on February 11, 1985, violates the Double Jeopardy Clause, given Cruz’s prior conviction in the Bronx for possessing the same weapon on February 5, 1985.
Holding
Yes, because unlawful possession of a weapon is a continuing offense, and the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits successive prosecutions for the same continuous possession.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals relied on Brown v. Ohio, which held that the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents prosecutors from dividing a single crime into multiple offenses based on temporal or spatial units. The court reasoned that Cruz’s possession of the handgun for six days constituted a single, continuous offense. Even if Cruz possessed the weapon at his home (which would be a lesser included offense), it would still constitute the “same crime” for double jeopardy purposes under Brown v. Ohio.
The court distinguished cases where a defendant abandons and then recovers a weapon, noting that continuous possession is essential to Cruz’s double jeopardy claim. Quoting Blockburger v. United States, the court stated that possession is “an offense continuous in its character”. The court further quoted United States v. Jones, stating that “(p)ossession is a course of conduct, not an act.”
The court emphasized that the legislature had not defined criminal possession in terms of specific “temporal units.” Instead, it is defined by “dominion” and “control.” Therefore, Cruz could only be prosecuted once for the continuous possession of the handgun, and the New York County indictment was barred by double jeopardy.