People v. Hager, 69 N.Y.2d 141 (1987)
Physical dexterity tests, such as walking a straight line, do not constitute testimonial evidence protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because they exhibit a person’s physical coordination, not their subjective knowledge or thought processes.
Summary
Hager was convicted of leaving the scene of an accident. Police apprehended him shortly after the incident and, smelling alcohol on his breath, administered physical coordination tests (e.g., balancing, walking a straight line) and a breathalyzer test without providing Miranda warnings. Hager argued the performance test results should be suppressed as a violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that physical dexterity tests do not elicit testimonial evidence and therefore do not trigger the requirement for Miranda warnings.
Facts
Catherine Kuehhas was struck by a car driven by Hager at approximately 12:40 a.m. on May 9, 1983.
Eyewitnesses reported that Hager stopped briefly at the scene but then drove away without providing identification.
Police pursued and apprehended Hager shortly after the incident.
The investigating officer detected the smell of alcohol on Hager’s breath.
Hager was taken to Central Testing Headquarters and consented to physical coordination tests and a breathalyzer test.
Miranda warnings were not given before the physical coordination tests.
Procedural History
Hager was convicted of violating Vehicle and Traffic Law § 600 (2)(a) and (b) (leaving the scene of an accident) and sentenced to probation.
Hager appealed, arguing that the physical performance test results should have been suppressed.
The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
Hager appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether the results of physical coordination tests administered to a suspect without Miranda warnings are admissible as evidence, or whether they violate the suspect’s privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment and the New York State Constitution.
Holding
No, because the privilege against self-incrimination applies only to testimonial or communicative evidence, and physical performance tests demonstrate a person’s physical condition rather than revealing subjective knowledge or thought processes.
Court’s Reasoning
The court reasoned that the privilege against self-incrimination protects individuals from being compelled to provide “evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature” (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761). The key distinction lies between evidence that reveals a person’s subjective knowledge or thought processes and evidence that simply exhibits a person’s physical characteristics or condition.
The court stated, “Evidence is ‘testimonial or communicative’ when it reveals a person’s subjective knowledge or thought processes.”
Physical performance tests, such as balancing tests and walking a straight line, fall into the latter category. They demonstrate a person’s degree of physical coordination, which is observable by police officers, rather than revealing any thoughts or beliefs.
“The defendant’s responses to those tests in this case indicated he had imbibed alcohol, not because the tests revealed defendant’s thoughts, but because his body’s responses differed from those of a sober person” (citing People v. Boudreau, 115 A.D.2d 652, 654).
The court concluded that because the performance tests did not elicit testimonial evidence, Miranda warnings were not required prior to their administration. The evidence obtained from the tests was therefore admissible.