People v. Calvano, 70 N.Y.2d 762 (1987)

Hearsay evidence is admissible to demonstrate inducement and a defendant’s state of mind when asserting an entrapment defense.

Summary

Defendant was convicted of selling drugs to an undercover officer. At trial, Calvano argued entrapment, attempting to introduce statements made to him by a paid police informant who introduced him to the officer. The trial court sustained the prosecutor’s hearsay objections and directed the jury to disregard the informant’s statements. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the informant’s statements were admissible to show inducement and the defendant’s state of mind, both critical to the entrapment defense. This case highlights the importance of allowing defendants to present evidence relevant to their state of mind when claiming entrapment.

Facts

The defendant, Calvano, was charged with selling drugs to an undercover police officer.
A paid police informant introduced Calvano to the undercover officer.
Calvano attempted to testify about statements made to him by the informant to support his entrapment defense.

Procedural History

Calvano was indicted for selling drugs.
At trial, the court sustained the prosecutor’s hearsay objections, preventing Calvano from presenting the informant’s statements.
Calvano was convicted.
The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision and ordered a new trial.

Issue(s)

Whether statements made by a police informant to the defendant are admissible as evidence to support an entrapment defense, specifically to demonstrate inducement and the defendant’s state of mind, even if such statements would otherwise be considered hearsay.

Holding

Yes, because the statements were offered to show inducement and the defendant’s state of mind, which are relevant to the entrapment defense as defined in Penal Law § 40.05.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that the trial court erred in excluding the informant’s statements as hearsay. The statements were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted within them, but rather to demonstrate the informant’s inducement and its effect on Calvano’s state of mind. The court referred to Penal Law § 40.05, which defines entrapment as engaging in proscribed conduct because induced or encouraged to do so by a person acting in cooperation with a public servant, seeking to obtain evidence against him for purposes of criminal prosecution. “As defense counsel noted at trial, the statements were admissible to show inducement and defendant’s state of mind, which was relevant to his contention that he ‘engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was induced or encouraged to do so by * * * a person acting in cooperation with a public servant, seeking to obtain evidence against him for purpose of criminal prosecution’ (Penal Law § 40.05).” Because the statements were critical to establishing the entrapment defense, their exclusion was prejudicial to the defendant, warranting a new trial. The court emphasized that all arguments relevant to the admissibility of the evidence were presented to the court during the trial, preserving the issue for appellate review.