68 N.Y.2d 775 (1986)
The procedural safeguards established in Batson v. Kentucky regarding peremptory challenges do not apply retroactively to cases where the normal appellate process was exhausted before Batson was decided.
Summary
The defendant was convicted of attempted murder and appealed, arguing that the prosecution’s use of peremptory challenges to exclude black jurors violated his right to an impartial jury under Batson v. Kentucky. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Batson’s new procedural rules do not apply retroactively to cases where the appellate process was complete before Batson was decided. The court also addressed and dismissed other claims related to the defendant’s mental state and the constitutionality of certain penal law sections.
Facts
The defendant was indicted on six counts, including attempted murder in the first degree, stemming from an alleged attempt to rob a gas station, commandeer a police car, and shoot at a police officer.
At trial, the defendant claimed mental disease or defect as a defense.
The prosecution introduced evidence that the defendant invoked his right to remain silent and requested an attorney after receiving Miranda warnings, to rebut the defense of mental disease or defect.
The defendant alleged the prosecutor systematically used peremptory challenges to exclude black prospective jurors.
Procedural History
The defendant was convicted and appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the conviction.
A judge of the Court of Appeals initially denied leave to appeal but reconsidered after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Batson v. Kentucky and subsequently granted leave.
Issue(s)
1. Whether the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to introduce evidence of the defendant’s post-Miranda silence and request for counsel to rebut the insanity defense, and whether defense counsel adequately preserved this issue for appeal.
2. Whether the rule established in Batson v. Kentucky, regarding the use of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors based on race, applies retroactively to cases where the appellate process had been exhausted before Batson was decided.
3. Whether the defendant’s argument regarding the unconstitutionality of Penal Law § 110.05, raised for the first time in the reply brief, should be considered by the court.
Holding
1. No, because defense counsel’s generalized objections did not adequately alert the trial judge to the specific arguments raised on appeal, thus failing to preserve the issue for review.
2. No, because Batson v. Kentucky is not applicable to cases where the normal appellate process has been exhausted.
3. No, because the argument was improperly raised for the first time in the appellant’s reply brief.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court found that the defense counsel’s generalized objections at trial were insufficient to preserve the issue of the defendant’s post-Miranda silence for appellate review. The court emphasized that specific objections are required to alert the trial judge to the precise nature of the alleged error.
Regarding the Batson issue, the Court relied on principles of retroactivity, stating that Batson does not apply retroactively to cases where the normal appellate process had already been exhausted. The Court cited Allen v. Hardy, which held that Batson’s rule is not mandated by Federal constitutional retroactivity principles. The court stated, “Batson is not applicable to a case where the normal appellate process has been exhausted, as occurred here.“
Finally, the Court declined to consider the defendant’s argument concerning the unconstitutionality of Penal Law § 110.05 because it was raised for the first time in the reply brief, violating established procedural rules against raising new arguments in reply briefs. The court cited State Farm Fire & Cos. Co. v LiMauro, noting the prohibition against sur-reply briefs. “This contention was improperly raised for the first time in appellant’s reply brief to this court.“