People v. Santos, 68 N.Y.2d 859 (1986)
When a defendant alleges a violation of their statutory right to a speedy trial under CPL 30.30, the People bear the burden of proving that any delays are excludable from the time calculation.
Summary
Santos was arrested in December 1978 and indicted on drug charges. He moved to dismiss the indictments nearly two years later, arguing he was denied a speedy trial. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in summarily denying Santos’s motion. Once the defendant alleges unexcused delay exceeding the statutory maximum, the burden shifts to the People to demonstrate that specific periods should be excluded. The People’s failure to provide specific dates and factual bases for exclusions warranted a hearing to resolve the factual disputes.
Facts
Defendant was arrested on December 6, 1978.
Two weeks later, he was arraigned on drug charges.
On October 31, 1980, defendant moved to dismiss the indictments based on a denial of his right to a speedy trial under CPL 30.20 and 30.30, alleging a two-year delay mostly attributable to the prosecution.
The prosecution responded that delays were due to plea negotiations and the defendant’s detention in New Jersey, but failed to specify dates or relevant exclusions.
Procedural History
The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss without a hearing.
The defendant was subsequently convicted on drug charges.
The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction without opinion.
The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division order, remitting the case for a hearing on the CPL 30.30 motion.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court erred in summarily denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictments based on CPL 30.30 without holding a hearing, given the defendant’s allegations of unexcused delay.
Holding
Yes, because when a defendant alleges unexcused delay exceeding the statutory maximum under CPL 30.30, the burden shifts to the People to controvert the factual basis for the motion and demonstrate that specific periods should be excluded from the time calculation. If the People’s papers present a factual dispute, a hearing is required.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals relied on CPL 210.45(4), which states that if a defendant moves to dismiss an indictment and alleges unexcused delay exceeding the statutory maximum, the motion must be granted unless the People controvert the factual basis for the motion. The court cited People v. Lomax, People v. Berkowitz, and People v. Gruden in support of this principle.
The court emphasized that, as stated in People v. Kendzia, once the defendant demonstrates unexcused delay, “the burden of showing that time should be excluded falls upon the People.”
Here, the defendant alleged a delay of nearly two years. While the initial affidavit lacked a precise starting date for the delay, the prosecutor’s response cured this defect.
The Court found that the People failed to meet their burden because they did not provide specific dates or a factual and statutory basis for each exclusion. The court noted that the People’s obligations under CPL 30.30 are independent of obligations under the Agreement on Detainers and the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, although time spent in other jurisdictions may be excludable under CPL 30.30.
The court concluded that because the prosecutor’s affidavit raised a factual dispute but did not establish compliance with speedy trial obligations as a matter of law, a hearing was required to determine the excludability of the alleged delays.