Lischynsky v. Lischynsky, 95 A.D.2d 111 (1983)

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Separation agreements containing explicit consent to jurisdiction clauses are enforceable, allowing New York courts to adjudicate claims regarding marital property located within the state, even after a foreign divorce decree.

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Summary

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A divorced couple, both Florida residents, had a separation agreement incorporated but not merged into their Florida divorce decree. The wife sued in New York, seeking equitable distribution of the husband’s interests in three New York corporations, a right she explicitly reserved in the separation agreement. The New York Court of Appeals held that the separation agreement contained a valid consent to jurisdiction clause, allowing New York courts to hear the case. This decision emphasizes the importance of clear and unambiguous language in separation agreements regarding jurisdictional matters and upholds the principle of contractual freedom to consent to jurisdiction.

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Facts

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Plaintiff and defendant, both Florida residents, entered a separation agreement in Florida. The agreement was incorporated, but not merged, into their subsequent Florida divorce decree.r
In the separation agreement, the plaintiff specifically reserved her right to pursue claims for equitable distribution of the defendant’s interests in three New York corporations.r
Article V of the agreement stated that the wife “does not waive any claim which she has in and to the above described right, title and ownership interest in said entities by virtue of her marriage to Husband or otherwise, and that she may pursue any such claims and rights against Husband…in any court(s) of competent jurisdiction which may have jurisdiction over said individuals and/or entities.”r

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Procedural History

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The plaintiff sued in New York, seeking equitable distribution of the defendant’s interests in the New York corporations.r
The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Special Term granted the motion, dismissing the action.r
The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that no personal, in rem, or quasi in rem jurisdiction had been acquired, and that the defendant had not consented to jurisdiction.r
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss.r

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Issue(s)

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Whether the separation agreement contained a valid consent to jurisdiction clause allowing New York courts to adjudicate the plaintiff’s claims regarding the defendant’s interests in the New York corporations.r

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Holding

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Yes, because the plain language of Article V of the separation agreement demonstrated the parties’ intent to allow New York courts to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant’s stock interests in the corporations.r

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Court’s Reasoning

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The court held that service was properly effected under CPLR 314(2), which pertains to actions where the plaintiff seeks a judgment affecting property within the state.r
Furthermore, the Court agreed with the dissent from the Appellate Division that Article V of the separation agreement constituted consent by the defendant to the exercise of jurisdiction by New York courts over his stock interests in the corporations.r
The Court reasoned that a plain reading of Article V supported no other conclusion. The agreement acknowledged the plaintiff’s existing claim to an interest in the New York corporations, her reservation of that claim, and her right to pursue it in a court