People v. Smith, 68 N.Y.2d 722 (1986)

Delays attributable to the prosecutor’s vacation are chargeable to the People and do not constitute exceptional circumstances excusing speedy trial violations, even if the defendant caused other delays in the case.

Summary

The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and dismissed the indictment against the defendant. The court held that the lengthy post-readiness delays caused by the trial assistant’s planned European vacation were not an “exceptional fact or circumstance” under CPL 30.30 (3) (b) sufficient to excuse the delay. The court emphasized that only the People’s delay is considered, unless the delay directly results from the defendant’s actions. Even though the defendant caused substantial delays, the People were also responsible for delays exceeding the statutory limit, requiring dismissal.

Facts

The defendant was indicted and the People declared their readiness for trial. However, the trial was significantly delayed. The defendant was responsible for a substantial portion of post-readiness delay, totaling approximately 17 months. The trial assistant was scheduled for a European vacation, which resulted in a 28-day adjournment. The People argued that the defendant’s delays constituted exceptional circumstances that excused the delay caused by the trial assistant’s vacation.

Procedural History

The case reached the Appellate Division, which presumably affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s order. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered the indictment dismissed, finding a violation of the defendant’s speedy trial rights.

Issue(s)

1. Whether lengthy post-readiness delays attributable to the trial assistant’s planned vacation constitute an “exceptional fact or circumstance” under CPL 30.30 (3)(b) sufficient to excuse adjournments chargeable to the People?
2. Whether the defendant’s post-readiness delays, even if substantial, constitute an exceptional circumstance within the meaning of CPL 30.30 (3)(b) in the absence of a causal relationship to the People’s delay?

Holding

1. No, because a prosecutor’s planned vacation does not constitute an exceptional circumstance, especially when another trial assistant could have been substituted.
2. No, because under CPL 30.30(3)(b), it is the People’s delay alone that is considered, unless the delay directly results from action taken by the defendant, and there was no causal relationship between the defendant’s delays and the prosecutor’s vacation.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that the 28-day adjournment due to the trial assistant’s vacation was chargeable to the People, citing precedent that shortages of personnel and illness of the prosecutor are chargeable to the People. The court found that the vacation did not qualify as an “exceptional fact or circumstance” that would excuse the delay, especially since a substitute trial assistant could have been assigned. The court further clarified the interpretation of CPL 30.30 (3) (b), stating that “[I]t is the People’s delay alone that is to be considered, except where that delay directly ‘results from’ action taken by the defendant.” Because the defendant’s post-readiness delays were not causally related to the trial assistant’s vacation, and the People were chargeable with more than six months of delay (164 days of prereadiness delay plus the 28-day vacation delay), the court concluded that the defendant’s speedy trial rights were violated, requiring dismissal of the indictment.