68 N.Y.2d 326 (1986)
Warrantless searches of commercial premises are unconstitutional unless the business is part of a pervasively regulated industry and the search is part of a regulatory scheme designed to further an urgent state interest, authorized by a statute carefully limited in time, place, and scope.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals held that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 415-a (5) (a) and New York City Charter § 436, authorizing warrantless inspections of vehicle dismantling businesses and junkyards, are unconstitutional. The police conducted a warrantless search of Burger’s junkyard, discovering stolen vehicles and parts. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court decisions, finding that the statutes authorized searches solely to uncover evidence of criminality, not to enforce a comprehensive regulatory scheme, thus violating the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Facts
Joseph Burger owned a junkyard in Brooklyn where he dismantled automobiles and sold their parts. On November 17, 1982, five plain-clothes police officers entered Burger’s junkyard without a warrant. They asked Burger if he was licensed to dismantle vehicles and if he had a “police book” (a record of vehicles and parts). Burger stated he did not have either. The officers then conducted a warrantless inspection under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 415-a, copying vehicle identification numbers (VINs) and serial numbers. The officers discovered stolen vehicles and parts and seized the property, leading to Burger’s arrest.
Procedural History
Burger moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the search was unconstitutional. The hearing court denied the motion, finding the auto junkyard industry pervasively regulated and the statute constitutional. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, granted the motion to suppress, vacated Burger’s guilty plea, dismissed the charges of criminal possession of stolen property, and remitted the case for further proceedings.
Issue(s)
Whether Vehicle and Traffic Law § 415-a (5) (a) and New York City Charter § 436 are facially unconstitutional because they authorize warrantless searches that are not designed to further any administrative objective, thus violating the Fourth Amendment?
Holding
Yes, because the statutes authorize searches undertaken solely to uncover evidence of criminality rather than to enforce a comprehensive regulatory scheme.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that while the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to commercial premises, an exception exists for industries deemed “pervasively regulated.” However, to validate a warrantless administrative search, the search must be part of a regulatory scheme designed to further an urgent State interest, and the State’s ability to conduct warrantless inspections must be essential to effectuating that scheme. Additionally, the authorizing statute must be carefully limited in time, place, and scope. The court emphasized that administrative searches must serve an administrative purpose and not be designed to uncover evidence of a crime.
The court distinguished the statutes in question from those upheld by the Supreme Court in cases like Donovan v. Dewey and United States v. Biswell, where the statutes authorized warrantless inspections by agents of the regulatory agency to determine compliance with specific regulations. In contrast, New York City Charter § 436 and Vehicle and Traffic Law § 415-a allowed general searches, including those conducted by the police, without requiring compliance with any administrative or regulatory scheme. The court noted that the search in this case was undertaken solely to discover whether Burger was storing stolen property on his premises, as conceded by the People. Therefore, because the statutes permitted warrantless searches designed to uncover evidence of criminality rather than enforce a regulatory scheme, they were deemed facially unconstitutional. The court stated, “The fundamental defect in the statutes before us is that they authorize searches undertaken solely to uncover evidence of criminality and not to enforce a comprehensive regulatory scheme.”