People v. Sinistaj, 67 N.Y.2d 236 (1986)
When a subsequent indictment replaces an earlier one in the same criminal action, it relates back to the original accusatory instrument for determining both the commencement of the speedy trial period and the computation of excludable time.
Summary
The case addresses whether excludable time under New York’s speedy trial statute (CPL 30.30(4)) applies to a second indictment that replaces an earlier one for the same criminal action. The Court of Appeals held that it does. The initial felony complaint was filed on November 20, 1981, followed by an indictment on December 3, 1981. A second indictment, correcting a legal deficiency in the first, was filed on July 13, 1982. The court reasoned that treating the subsequent indictment differently under subdivisions (1)(a) and (4) of CPL 30.30 would be inconsistent with the statute’s purpose and create an arbitrary cutoff for replacement indictments. The court emphasized that CPL 30.30 is a prosecutorial readiness rule designed to ensure prompt trials.
Facts
Defendant was initially charged with criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. The first indictment was flawed because it charged possession in a “place of business,” which was excluded under the relevant Penal Law section. The second indictment corrected this by charging possession under a different subsection of the same Penal Law section, requiring proof of a prior felony conviction. Both indictments related to the same weapon and criminal transaction.
Procedural History
The Supreme Court dismissed both indictments, finding delays exceeding six months chargeable to the People. The Appellate Division reinstated the first indictment but affirmed the dismissal of the second, reasoning that the excludable time periods were inapplicable since the second indictment was filed more than six months after the original complaint. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals from the Appellate Division’s decision regarding the second indictment.
Issue(s)
Whether, for purposes of CPL 30.30, a subsequent indictment replacing an earlier one in the same criminal action should be related back to the original accusatory instrument not only for determining the commencement of the six-month readiness period under CPL 30.30(1)(a), but also for computing excludable time under CPL 30.30(4)?
Holding
Yes, because treating a subsequent indictment differently under CPL 30.30(1)(a) and CPL 30.30(4) would contradict the statute’s intent and create an arbitrary six-month limit on replacement indictments.
Court’s Reasoning
The court relied on prior decisions in People v. Lomax and People v. Osgood, which held that a new indictment after dismissal of the original relates back to the initial accusatory instrument for the six-month readiness period. The court reasoned that applying this principle only to CPL 30.30(1)(a) but not to CPL 30.30(4) would be inconsistent and violate statutory construction rules. The court stated, “[A] rule that succeeding indictments are not to be related back to the commencement of the criminal action for computing excludable time would have consequences which do not further the aim of CPL 30.30 and could not have been contemplated by the Legislature.” It emphasized that CPL 30.30 is a prosecutorial readiness rule and that the District Attorney is entitled to only one six-month readiness period, which commences upon filing the initial accusatory instrument. The court also noted that CPL 200.80 permits the People to seek another indictment anytime before a guilty plea or trial commencement. The Court stated that CPL 30.30 must be interpreted “so as to harmonize its various provisions.” The court emphasized that its decision only applies when the new indictment is “directly derived” from the first accusatory instrument.