In re সারোয়ার, 76 N.Y.2d 154 (1990)
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While ex parte communication by a judge is improper, removal from office is not a per se rule and mitigating factors, such as an unblemished record of service, may warrant censure instead.
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Summary
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A Justice of the Stephentown Town Court was charged with seeking special consideration for his son’s traffic citation by making ex parte contact with a Justice of another Town Court. The State Commission on Judicial Conduct determined removal from office was warranted. The Court of Appeals rejected the Commission’s determination and instead imposed censure, finding that while the conduct was improper, the judge’s 21-year unblemished record and other mitigating factors did not warrant removal. The court emphasized that ticket-fixing doesn’t automatically require removal, especially when considering mitigating circumstances.
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Facts
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The petitioner, a Town Justice, contacted a Justice of the Schuyler Town Court regarding a traffic citation issued to his son. He identified himself as a Judge and inquired about the procedures for resolving his son’s case. The petitioner did not specifically request favorable treatment, but his actions were deemed improper.
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Procedural History
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The State Commission on Judicial Conduct determined that the petitioner should be removed from office. The petitioner sought review of this determination in the Court of Appeals.
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Issue(s)
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Whether the ex parte communication by the petitioner warrants removal from office, or if mitigating factors justify a lesser sanction of censure.
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Holding
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No, because while the judge’s conduct was improper, his 21-year unblemished record of service, his clouded judgment due to his son’s involvement, and his cooperation with the Commission warrant censure instead of removal.
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Court’s Reasoning
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The Court found that the petitioner’s actions violated sections 100.1 and 100.2 of the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct and canons 1 and 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which prohibit ex parte communications. Citing Matter of Lonschein, 50 NY2d 569, 572, the court stated that the absence of a specific request for favorable treatment is irrelevant, and