People v. McKenzie, 67 N.Y.2d 695 (1986)
Statutory presumptions in New York are permissive, and their use in jury instructions is constitutional as long as the instructions explicitly indicate that the presumption is permissive and does not shift the burden of proof to the defendant.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction for criminal possession of a weapon, holding that the statutory presumptions regarding weapon possession and intent to use it unlawfully were constitutional. The Court emphasized that New York’s statutory presumptions are permissive, not mandatory, and the jury instructions in this case clearly indicated their permissive nature. The Court also noted that the defendant failed to object to the instructions at trial, and the limited exception to the preservation requirement outlined in People v. Patterson did not apply. Furthermore, the Court rejected the defendant’s argument regarding the indictment’s specificity, finding it met the established standard.
Facts
The defendant, McKenzie, was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the second and third degrees. At trial, the prosecution relied on Penal Law § 265.15 (3) and (4), which contain statutory presumptions concerning weapon possession and intent to use a weapon unlawfully against another. McKenzie argued that these presumptions, along with the jury charge, unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof to him.
Procedural History
The case reached the New York Court of Appeals after the defendant was convicted at trial. The Appellate Division’s order affirming the conviction was appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
1. Whether the statutory presumptions in Penal Law § 265.15 (3) and (4) unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof to the defendant.
2. Whether the jury instructions regarding the statutory presumptions were proper.
3. Whether the indictment counts were sufficiently precise to inform the defendant of the accusations against him.
Holding
1. No, because statutory presumptions in New York are permissive and do not mandate that the jury draw a particular inference.
2. Yes, because the instructions explicitly indicated that the presumption was permissive.
3. Yes, because the counts met the standard set forth in People v. Iannone, and the defendant failed to request a bill of particulars.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court relied on precedent from the Supreme Court of the United States, particularly Francis v. Franklin, Sandstrom v. Montana, and Ulster County Court v. Allen, which established that jury instructions must clearly state that presumptions are permissive, not mandatory. The Court distinguished Francis v. Franklin, noting that the jury instructions in the present case explicitly indicated that the presumption was permissive, avoiding an impermissible burden shift. The Court stated, “Statutory presumptions in New York are permissive (see, People v Lemmons, 40 NY2d 505; People v Leyva, 38 NY2d 160), as the Supreme Court itself noted in Ulster County Ct. v Allen (supra).” The Court also emphasized the defendant’s failure to object to the jury instructions, which generally precludes appellate review. Finally, addressing the indictment’s specificity, the Court found that the counts met the standard articulated in People v. Iannone, and the defendant’s failure to request a bill of particulars waived any claim of insufficient notice. The court noted that “The counts met the standard set forth in People v Iannone (45 NY2d 589), and, if additional information was significant to the preparation of the defense, the defendant should have requested a bill of particulars. Having failed to do so, he cannot now complain that the charges lacked specificity.”