People v. Wood, 66 N.Y.2d 374 (1985)
Questioning a witness about their religious beliefs or decision to affirm rather than swear an oath is generally improper and prejudicial, requiring a new trial unless extraordinary circumstances exist or the trial judge provides a prompt and clear corrective instruction.
Summary
The defendant was convicted of second-degree murder. A key element of his defense was his mental state at the time of the crime, supported by expert psychiatric testimony. During cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned the defense psychiatrist about his decision to affirm rather than swear to the truth of his testimony and whether he believed in God. The defense objected, but the objections were overruled. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that such questioning was improper and prejudicial, requiring a new trial because the trial judge’s curative instruction was insufficient to remove the prejudice.
Facts
The defendant admitted to strangling the victim after having sexual intercourse with her, striking her head with a glass jar, and then unsuccessfully attempting suicide. His defense was based on a lack of mental competence at the time of the killing. The primary defense witness, a psychiatrist, Dr. Teich, testified that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect. Dr. Teich affirmed, rather than swore, to the truth of his testimony.
Procedural History
The defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree in the trial court. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, concluding that any error from the prosecutor’s questioning was harmless due to the trial court’s instructions. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, ordering a new trial.
Issue(s)
Whether the prosecutor’s questioning of the defense psychiatrist regarding his religious beliefs and his decision to affirm, rather than swear, to the truth of his testimony constitutes reversible error.
Holding
Yes, because such questioning is generally improper and prejudicial, and the trial court’s curative instruction was insufficient to mitigate the prejudice in this case.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals found that the prosecutor’s questioning was improper because a witness’s religious beliefs or decision to affirm rather than swear are irrelevant to their credibility. New York State’s Constitution provides that “no person shall be rendered incompetent to be a witness on account of his opinions on matters of religious belief.” The court noted that the trial judge’s actions gave “standing to the statement of the District Attorney as legitimate” and the later instruction on the equivalency of an affirmation and an oath, coming as it did in the middle of an extended charge, with no apparent emphasis or reference to its earlier rulings, cannot be deemed to have vitiated the prejudice caused by the court’s earlier apparent indorsement of the improper questioning.
The court distinguished this case from others where harmless error was found, emphasizing that the issue of the defendant’s mental state was a close question, the prosecutor’s remarks were unprovoked, the misconduct was fully preserved for review, and the trial judge did not promptly and forcefully address the prejudice. Because the evidence regarding the defendant’s mental state was not overwhelming and the improper impeachment of the defense expert could have swayed the jury, a new trial was warranted. The Court relied on the principle articulated in prior holdings and CPL 470.05[1], focusing on the quantum and nature of the proof, and the likelihood that, if the error had not been committed, the outcome would have been different.