People v. Quevas, 81 N.Y.2d 70 (1993): Admissibility of Prior Identification Testimony When Witness Refuses to Identify Due to Fear

People v. Quevas, 81 N.Y.2d 70 (1993)

Third-party testimony recounting a witness’s pretrial identification of the defendant is inadmissible under CPL 60.25 when the witness refuses to make an in-court identification due to fear, as the statute requires the witness to be unable to identify the defendant based on present recollection.

Summary

Abraham Rodriguez was robbed and identified two of his assailants to police shortly after the incident. However, at a pretrial hearing and subsequent trial, Rodriguez refused to identify the defendants in court, stating he feared for his life. The trial court allowed the police officers to testify about Rodriguez’s prior identification, and the defendants were convicted. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that CPL 60.25 does not permit third-party testimony of a prior identification when the witness’s refusal to identify is based on fear, not an inability to recall.

Facts

Abraham Rodriguez was robbed by a group of men after leaving a bar. He reported the robbery to the police and, while in a patrol car, identified two men on the street as his assailants. The police arrested the two men. Rodriguez stated that a third man who was with them was not involved. At the time of arrest, one defendant had $70, and the other had no cash.

Procedural History

At a pretrial Wade hearing, Rodriguez refused to identify the defendants, citing fear for his safety. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to preclude the police officer’s testimony regarding the prior identification. The defendants were convicted of first-degree robbery. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions, finding the officers’ testimony admissible due to Rodriguez’s fear. A dissenting judge believed the fear was an improper basis for admitting the testimony. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

Issue(s)

Whether, under CPL 60.25, an eyewitness’s refusal to identify defendants because of fear allows the admission of third-party testimony of an identification made by him at the time of arrest.

Holding

No, because CPL 60.25 requires that the witness be unable to make an identification “on the basis of present recollection,” and the witness’s fear indicates a present ability to identify, not an inability to recall.

Court’s Reasoning

The court emphasized that third-party testimony of a prior identification is generally inadmissible. CPL 60.25 provides a specific exception, allowing such testimony only when the witness is “unable at the proceeding to state, on the basis of present recollection, whether or not the defendant is the person in question.” The court reasoned that Rodriguez’s refusal to identify the defendants stemmed from fear, demonstrating that he was, in fact, able to recognize them. The court stated that “By his repeated refusals to identify defendants because of fear of retribution, Rodriguez manifested not an inability to identify these defendants — a neutral fact — but the converse.” The court distinguished this situation from cases where the witness’s inability to identify the defendant resulted from a lapse of time or a change in appearance, which would properly invoke CPL 60.25. The court explicitly declined to extend the application of CPL 60.25 to situations where fear prevents identification, as this would contradict the statute’s clear language requiring an inability to identify based on present recollection.