Anzalone v. Radigan, 69 N.Y.2d 640 (1986)
An easement obtained by adverse possession at a specific location cannot be relocated to a new location that further restricts the easement holder’s right of way, especially when the easement holder promptly objects to the relocation.
Summary
This case involves a dispute between neighbors over an easement for ingress and egress. The defendants, Radigan, had maintained a barrier on Flower Hill Road, arguably establishing rights to the easement by adverse possession at that location. However, they moved the barrier to a new location, further restricting Anzalone’s use of the road. Anzalone sought an injunction to restore the barrier to its original location. The New York Court of Appeals held that even if the defendants had acquired rights by adverse possession to maintain a barrier at the original location, they had no right to move it to a new location that further restricted the plaintiff’s right of way, especially after the plaintiff promptly objected.
Facts
Anzalone’s deed granted her a right of ingress and egress over Flower Hill Road, which abutted both properties. Radigan moved a barrier on Flower Hill Road to a new location, which further restricted Anzalone’s access. Anzalone promptly objected to the relocation of the barrier. Radigan argued that removing the relocated barrier would require trespassing on a non-party’s property.
Procedural History
Anzalone sued Radigan, seeking an injunction to compel the removal of the barrier from its new location and restore it to its original location. The lower courts ruled in favor of Anzalone, ordering the removal of the barrier. Radigan appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether a party who may have acquired rights to an easement by adverse possession based on the existence of a barrier at one location can move that barrier to a new location that further restricts the easement holder’s use of the road, over the easement holder’s objection.
Holding
No, because even if the defendants acquired rights by adverse possession to maintain a barrier at the original location, they had no right to move it to a new location that further restricted the plaintiff’s right of way, especially after the plaintiff promptly objected.
Court’s Reasoning
The court reasoned that while the defendants might have acquired rights to the easement by adverse possession based on the barrier’s long-standing presence at the original location (citing Brand v Prince, 35 NY2d 634, 636; Belotti v Bickhardt, 228 NY 296, 302), those rights were limited to that specific location. The court emphasized that the defendants could not extend their adverse possession rights to a new location that further burdened the plaintiff’s easement. The court stated, “Whatever rights defendants may have acquired to the easement by adverse possession, based on the long-continued existence of a barrier at one location on Flower Hill Road, defendants obtained no right to move that barrier to a new location on Flower Hill Road so as to further restrict plaintiff’s use of the road, a move which was promptly objected to by plaintiff.” The court further noted that Anzalone’s property interest in ingress and egress permitted removal of the barrier, even if it meant entering the right of way. The court explicitly stated that it was not reaching any other issue.