Frazier v. State, 64 N.Y.2d 807 (1985)
The State can be held liable for the negligent actions of an off-duty peace officer if those actions fall within the scope of their statutory and departmental authorization, requiring a factual determination of negligence and application of respondeat superior principles.
Summary
Frazier sued the State to recover damages for injuries sustained when an off-duty correction officer shot him. The officer, employed at Green Haven Correctional Facility, shot Frazier while pursuing suspected robbers. The Appellate Division ruled that the State could not be liable for an off-duty peace officer’s actions as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because peace officers are authorized to carry firearms, make arrests, and use force even when off-duty, a trial is necessary to determine if the officer was negligent and if the State is liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The court emphasized that statutory and departmental authorization created a potential scope of employment issue.
Facts
Robert Warner, a New York State correction officer employed at Green Haven Correctional Facility, was off-duty. Warner was allegedly robbed by two men in a housing project in Manhattan. While pursuing the alleged robbers, Warner shot Frazier, a bystander, in the foot.
Procedural History
Frazier brought an action against the State in the Court of Claims to recover damages for his injuries. The Appellate Division held that the State could not be liable for the acts of a peace officer making an arrest while off duty. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and granted a new trial.
Issue(s)
Whether the State can be held liable for the negligent actions of an off-duty peace officer when the officer is authorized by statute and departmental policy to carry a firearm, make arrests, and use force, requiring a factual determination of negligence and application of respondeat superior principles.
Holding
Yes, because considering the statutory and departmental authorization for peace officers to carry firearms, make arrests when off duty, and use force, the claim presents questions of fact requiring a trial to determine whether Warner was negligent and, if so, whether the State is liable under traditional concepts of respondeat superior.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Appellate Division erred in holding that the State could not be liable as a matter of law. The court emphasized the statutory authorization for peace officers, even when off-duty, to act under certain circumstances. CPL 140.25(3) allows a peace officer to make an arrest even when off duty if they have reasonable cause to believe a felony has been committed. Furthermore, the court cited Penal Law (former) § 265.20 (a) (1) (a) regarding the authorization to carry firearms and Penal Law § 35.30 regarding the use of force.
The court stated that “the claim presents questions of fact requiring a trial to determine whether Warner was negligent and, if so, whether the State is liable under traditional concepts of respondeat superior.” The court referenced Riviello v. Waldron, 47 N.Y.2d 297, 302, 303 and Restatement (Second) of Agency § 229, highlighting the importance of determining whether the employee’s actions were within the scope of employment. The court differentiated the instant case from cases where the employee’s actions were clearly outside the scope of employment. The presence of statutory and departmental authorization created a fact question regarding the scope of Warner’s employment at the time of the shooting.