People ex rel. Thorpe v. Von Holden, 63 N.Y.2d 549 (1984)
Habeas corpus is a proper remedy to challenge the unlawful retention of a person found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect when the Commissioner of Mental Health fails to comply with the statutory timeframes for retention hearings.
Summary
George Thorpe, found not guilty of assault by reason of mental disease, sought habeas corpus relief, arguing the Commissioner of Mental Health failed to adhere to CPL 330.20’s procedural requirements for retention hearings. The Court of Appeals held that habeas corpus is indeed an appropriate remedy when the Commissioner fails to comply with the statutory timeframes. The court emphasized the importance of timely hearings to protect the rights of the detainee, but also acknowledged the state’s interest in public safety. Thus, the court ordered a conditional release, requiring a retention hearing to commence within ten days, balancing individual liberty with community protection.
Facts
George Thorpe was committed to the Department of Mental Health in 1979 after being found not guilty of assault in the second degree due to mental disease. In August 1981, the Commissioner applied for a first retention order, but failed to serve Thorpe’s attorney. Thorpe requested a hearing, which was not held. A second retention order application was made in February 1983, but it was untimely under CPL 330.20(9).
Procedural History
Thorpe filed a habeas corpus petition, which the County Court dismissed. The Appellate Division affirmed, directing the Commissioner to apply for a first retention order. Thorpe appealed to the Court of Appeals after the Appellate Division ruled habeas corpus was inappropriate. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy to challenge the continued retention of a defendant committed under CPL 330.20 when the Commissioner of Mental Health has failed to comply with the statutory timeframes for retention hearings.
Holding
Yes, because compliance with the statutory time schedule, including the prompt setting of a hearing after demand, is a condition of retention of a defendant held pursuant to CPL 330.20.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals recognized the legislative intent to balance public safety with the rights of defendants found not responsible due to mental illness. Referencing Matter of Torsney, 47 N.Y.2d 667 (1979), the court reiterated that automatic commitment is permissible only for a reasonable time for examination. The court emphasized the Commissioner’s obligation to initiate retention proceedings within the statutory timeframe. It cited Hoff v. State of New York, 279 N.Y. 490 (1939) to reinforce that habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to challenge unlawful detention and that the Legislature cannot suspend the writ. The court stated, “The Legislature could not deprive any person within the State of the privilege of a writ of habeas corpus. (N. Y. Const. art 1, § 4.)” The court rejected the argument that Thorpe waived his right to a hearing by failing to schedule it, stating it is the Commissioner’s responsibility to obtain a retention order. The court concluded that a conditional release order is appropriate where the papers indicate a dangerous mental disorder, balancing the individual’s rights with public safety concerns. The court noted persons found not guilty by reason of mental disease are “an exceptional class of individuals who may properly be treated somewhat differently” (People ex rel. Henig v Commissioner of Mental Hygiene, 43 NY2d 334, 338). Immediate release would require civil commitment proceedings, requiring a higher burden of proof. The court thus held a hearing must commence within 10 days or the detainee will be released.