Young v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., 91 A.D.2d 725 (1982)
To invoke the continuous treatment doctrine and toll the statute of limitations in a medical malpractice case, a patient must demonstrate a timely return visit to the doctor to complain about and seek treatment for a matter related to the initial treatment; a significant lapse in time between treatments breaks the continuity.
Summary
This case addresses the continuous treatment doctrine in the context of medical malpractice. The plaintiff sued the defendant doctor for malpractice relating to a surgery performed in 1974. After being discharged in 1976, the plaintiff did not see the defendant again until 1979. The court held that the significant gap between treatments broke the continuity required to toll the statute of limitations under the continuous treatment doctrine, thus barring the plaintiff’s claim. The decision emphasizes the necessity of a timely return visit to complain about and seek treatment for a matter related to the initial treatment.
Facts
The plaintiff underwent nose surgery performed by the defendant doctor in 1974.
She was discharged by the defendant on January 14, 1976.
On February 24, 1979, the plaintiff returned to see the defendant, complaining about breathing difficulties and a concave indentation in her nose.
There was no contact between the plaintiff and the defendant or any other physician regarding her nose between January 14, 1976, and February 24, 1979.
Procedural History
The defendant doctor moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff’s malpractice claim was time-barred.
The plaintiff opposed the motion, asserting the continuous treatment doctrine tolled the statute of limitations.
The lower court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.
Issue(s)
Whether the continuous treatment doctrine applies to toll the statute of limitations in a medical malpractice case when there is a significant lapse in time between the initial treatment and the subsequent visit.
Holding
No, because the required continuity has not been established through “a timely return visit instigated by the patient to complain about and seek treatment for a matter related to the initial treatment.”
Court’s Reasoning
The court reasoned that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate the required continuity of treatment necessary to toll the statute of limitations. The court emphasized that a substantial period of time passed between the plaintiff’s discharge in 1976 and her return visit in 1979. This break in time was fatal to her claim. The court cited McDermott v. Torre, 56 NY2d 399, 406, stating that the continuous treatment doctrine requires “a timely return visit instigated by the patient to complain about and seek treatment for a matter related to the initial treatment.”
The court distinguished the facts from cases where the continuous treatment doctrine was successfully invoked, emphasizing the absence of any contact between the plaintiff and the defendant (or any other physician) concerning her nose during the almost three-year period. The court suggested that while a visit for the sole purpose of ascertaining the patient’s condition might not qualify as continuous treatment, the dispositive factor was the lack of any contact during the extended period. Even if the 1979 visit was not a mere “ploy to revive the time-barred action” (Florio v Cook, 65 AD2d 548, affd 48 NY2d 792), the absence of ongoing contact negated the claim of continuous treatment.
The decision highlights the importance of a timely return visit by the patient and reinforces the principle that a significant lapse in treatment severs the continuity required for tolling the statute of limitations.