Alquijay v. St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hospital Center, 63 N.Y.2d 978 (1984)
In New York, a child born with a disability cannot recover damages in a wrongful life action based on a claim that negligent prenatal testing induced the parents to carry the pregnancy to term.
Summary
The plaintiff, born with Down’s Syndrome, sued the defendant hospitals alleging negligence in performing an amniocentesis test on her mother. The hospitals erroneously reported that the mother would give birth to a normal male child, which led her to carry the pregnancy to term instead of aborting the fetus. The plaintiff sought to recover the extraordinary expenses for special care and services she would incur upon reaching majority. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, holding that a cause of action for wrongful life is not legally cognizable in New York, as it requires comparing the value of impaired life to nonexistence.
Facts
The plaintiff’s mother underwent an amniocentesis test during pregnancy to determine if the fetus had any genetic abnormalities.
The defendant hospitals negligently reported that the test indicated the mother would give birth to a normal male child.
Relying on this report, the mother carried the pregnancy to term, resulting in the birth of the plaintiff, who has Down’s Syndrome.
The plaintiff’s condition will require special treatment and care throughout her lifetime.
The parents’ claims for damages were time-barred, leaving only the infant’s claim.
Procedural History
The Special Term denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the infant’s cause of action.
The Appellate Division reversed the Special Term’s decision and dismissed the complaint, relying on Becker v. Schwartz.
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.
Issue(s)
Whether an infant born with a disability can recover damages from a hospital for the extraordinary expenses incurred due to the disability, based on the hospital’s negligent prenatal testing that induced the parents to carry the pregnancy to term.
Holding
No, because the plaintiff’s cause of action is one for wrongful life, which is not legally cognizable in New York, as it demands a comparison between impaired life and nonexistence that the law is not equipped to make.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals agreed with the Appellate Division that the plaintiff’s cause of action was, in essence, a claim for wrongful life, which New York law does not recognize, citing Becker v. Schwartz. The court emphasized that while the parents might have had a valid claim for their pecuniary expenses if it had been timely brought, the infant’s claim for her own wrongful life was different. Such a claim, the court reasoned, “demands a calculation of damages dependent upon a comparison between the Hobson’s choice of life in an impaired state and nonexistence”, a calculation that the law is unable to perform. The court further stated that the argument for allowing recovery based on public policy was better addressed to the Legislature. The court distinguished between the parents’ potential claim for breach of duty, which could have entitled them to recover pecuniary expenses, and the infant’s wrongful life claim, which lacked a legally cognizable injury. This case reinforces the principle that the judiciary is not suited to assess the value of life with disabilities versus no life at all; such considerations are best left to legislative action.