Matter of Anthony M., 63 N.Y.2d 270 (1984): Discretion to Allow Surrebuttal Testimony

Matter of Anthony M., 63 N.Y.2d 270 (1984)

A trial court has discretion to permit surrebuttal testimony when the prosecution’s rebuttal evidence goes beyond the scope of proper rebuttal; however, the denial of a reasonable request for a continuance to secure such testimony can constitute an abuse of discretion, especially when a fundamental right of the accused is abridged.

Summary

This case concerns the trial court’s denial of a continuance requested by the defendant to secure surrebuttal testimony after the prosecution presented rebuttal evidence that went beyond the scope of proper rebuttal. The Court of Appeals held that while the trial court has discretion in such matters, denying a reasonable continuance to allow the defendant to counter unexpected testimony can be an abuse of discretion, infringing upon the defendant’s right to present a defense. The dissent argued the denial was prejudicial, warranting a new trial, because the rebuttal testimony differed substantially from prior expert testimony, and the defense had no prior notice.

Facts

During the trial, after the People’s rebuttal witness, Dr. Hyland, testified in a manner inconsistent with previous expert testimony, defendant Godbee’s attorney requested a brief recess, which was followed by a request for a continuance to secure additional testimony to counter Dr. Hyland’s statements.

The defense attorney argued that Dr. Hyland’s testimony presented new information not previously disclosed and differed significantly from the other expert witnesses, thus necessitating an opportunity to secure surrebuttal testimony.

Procedural History

The trial court denied the defendant’s request for a continuance and a subsequent motion for a mistrial. The defendant was convicted. The Appellate Division reversed. This appeal followed, focusing on the propriety of denying the continuance for surrebuttal.

Issue(s)

Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the defendant’s request for a continuance to secure surrebuttal testimony after the prosecution presented rebuttal evidence that arguably exceeded the scope of proper rebuttal?

Holding

No, the order was affirmed because, in the companion case, the court held the error harmless. However, the dissent argued that the denial was an abuse of discretion because the rebuttal testimony introduced new and unexpected information, and the defense was not given a fair opportunity to respond.

Court’s Reasoning

The majority, while not explicitly addressing the surrebuttal issue in *Matter of Anthony M.*, implied that the trial court has discretion to manage the order of proof and determine the admissibility of evidence. However, the dissenting opinion (applied to *People v. Cable and Godbee*) emphasized the importance of allowing a defendant to present a complete defense, especially when confronted with unexpected testimony during rebuttal. The dissent argued that denying the continuance, especially when the rebuttal testimony deviated substantially from previous expert testimony and when the defense had no prior notice of the new information, constituted an abuse of discretion. The dissent cited Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302, underscoring that “Few rights are more fundamental than that Of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense”. The dissent also quoted People v Foy, 32 NY2d 473, 477, stating “mere inconvenience is not sufficient ground for denying an adjournment when to do so would abridge a basic right”. Judge Meyer, in dissent, concluded that the denial of a brief adjournment was “an ‘abuse of discretion, in a legal sense * * * [and] a plain error of law’ (Meyer v Cullen, 54 NY 392, 397).”