63 N.Y.2d 19 (1984)
A plaintiff cannot recover for injuries sustained as a direct result of their knowing and intentional participation in a criminal act, if the criminal act is judged to be so serious an offense as to warrant denial of recovery; CPLR 1411 does not abrogate this rule.
Summary
A 15-year-old plaintiff was injured while constructing a “pipe bomb” and sued a 9-year-old defendant who allegedly sold firecrackers to the plaintiff’s companions, from which they extracted gunpowder. The lower courts granted summary judgment dismissing the cause of action against the defendant. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that public policy denies judicial relief to those injured while committing a serious criminal act. The rule of comparative negligence does not apply when the injury is a direct result of the plaintiff’s participation in a serious criminal act.
Facts
George Barker, nearly 15, and two companions made a pipe bomb in Barker’s backyard. The bomb was constructed using a metal pipe filled with gunpowder. Barker obtained the pipe, caps, and drill from his father’s workshop. Barker claimed the gunpowder came from firecrackers purchased by his companions, the Kallash brothers, from 9-year-old Daniel Melucci, Jr. The bomb exploded as Barker was capping it, severely injuring his hands.
Procedural History
Barker sued the Kallash brothers for their part in the bomb’s construction, Melucci for selling the firecrackers, and Robert Judge for allegedly selling the firecrackers to Melucci. He also sued the parents of each infant defendant for negligent supervision. The Meluccis moved for summary judgment, arguing that Barker was barred from recovering for injuries sustained while engaged in wrongful or illegal conduct. The trial court granted the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding the plaintiff’s conduct to be beyond mere prankish or foolish behavior.
Issue(s)
Whether a plaintiff who is injured while constructing a pipe bomb can maintain a tort action against a defendant who allegedly sold the firecrackers used to make the bomb.
Whether CPLR 1411, which establishes comparative negligence, permits a plaintiff injured during the commission of a serious illegal act to recover damages.
Holding
No, because the public policy of New York generally denies judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act.
No, because CPLR 1411 does not apply to injuries sustained as a direct result of the plaintiff’s own illegal conduct of a serious nature involving risk of physical harm.
Court’s Reasoning
The court distinguished between regulated lawful activities and prohibited activities. A violation of a statute regulating an activity constitutes negligence, subject to comparative negligence principles. However, when a plaintiff engages in activities prohibited by law, courts will not entertain the suit if the plaintiff’s conduct was a serious violation, and the injuries were a direct result. This denial of recovery stems from public policy, not contributory negligence. As the court stated, “[T]he paramount public policy imperative that the law, whatever its content at a given time or for however limited a period, be obeyed”.
The court emphasized that constructing a bomb is a far more dangerous activity than merely using firecrackers. Although Barker was a minor, he was not so young as to be unaware that building a bomb was wrongful and dangerous.
Regarding CPLR 1411, the court stated that it abolished contributory negligence, but it did not create a new cause of action for those injured while participating in serious illegal acts. The rule precluding recovery in such cases is based on public policy, meaning that “proof of such an injury would not demonstrate any cause of action cognizable at law”.
The court directly addressed the argument that this decision was overly puritanical, clarifying that the court was not permitting a criminal to profit from their criminal act, but preventing a person from obtaining legal compensation for injuries directly resulting from knowingly participating in a criminal act. The court reasoned that it will not create a system where one can profit from their own wrong-doing, referencing Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506.