Under 21 v. City of New York, 65 N.Y.2d 344 (1985): Executive Overreach and Legislative Authority in Municipal Contracting

Under 21 v. City of New York, 65 N.Y.2d 344 (1985)

An executive order that mandates a specific percentage of city contracts to be awarded to a particular category of business, without specific legislative authorization, constitutes an unlawful usurpation of legislative power.

Summary

This case addresses the separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches in New York City. The Mayor issued an executive order requiring that 10% of city construction contracts be awarded to “locally based enterprises” (LBEs). Trade associations challenged the order. The court held that the Mayor exceeded his authority by creating a program that mandated preferential treatment for a specific group without explicit legislative authorization. The court emphasized that while the Mayor has broad executive powers, he cannot legislate policy, particularly regarding the allocation of public contracts, without a specific delegation of such power from the City Council.

Facts

In an effort to stimulate economic development in depressed areas of New York City, the Mayor issued Executive Order No. 53. The order mandated that city agencies ensure that at least 10% of the total dollar amount of construction contracts be awarded to Locally Based Enterprises (LBEs). LBEs were defined as businesses with gross receipts of $500,000 or less that either earned a substantial amount of their income in an economic development area or employed a substantial number of economically disadvantaged persons. Seventeen trade associations challenged the legality of the order.

Procedural History

The plaintiffs, trade associations, filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to invalidate the Executive Order. The defendants, the Mayor and the City of New York, moved to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. The Special Term granted the motion to dismiss. The Appellate Division reversed, declaring the order and its regulations unconstitutional, unlawful, and unenforceable. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether the Mayor of the City of New York, through an executive order, can lawfully mandate that a specific percentage of all construction contracts be awarded to “locally based enterprises” without specific legislative authorization.

Holding

No, because the executive’s action constitutes an unlawful usurpation of legislative power in the absence of a specific delegation of that power from the legislature.

Court’s Reasoning

The court emphasized the separation of powers doctrine, noting that the City Council holds legislative power in New York City, while the Mayor is the chief executive responsible for implementing and enforcing legislative pronouncements. The Mayor cannot prescribe a remedial device not embraced by the City Council’s policy. The court relied on precedent, citing Matter of Fullilove v. Beame and Matter of Broidrick v. Lindsay, where executive actions establishing affirmative action plans were struck down for exceeding executive authority. The court stated, “Where, as here, the executive adopts a plan specifying that a certain percentage of city construction contracts are to be allotted to a particular group or category of business enterprise, he has gone beyond his function of implementing general Charter-conferred powers. Such action constitutes an exercise of legislative power.” The court emphasized that the legislature must specifically delegate the power to mandate awards of construction contracts to a particular group, along with adequate guidelines and standards. Because no such specific legislative authority was granted to the Mayor, the executive action was deemed an unlawful usurpation of the legislative function. The court acknowledged the Mayor’s broad powers under the New York City Charter, including the power to enter into contracts. However, it clarified that the general power to contract does not provide a basis for creating a remedial plan absent specific legislative authorization. The court concluded that “However desirable the ostensible purpose may be, there is simply no legislative authority permitting the Mayor to unilaterally initiate this type of program or the means for effectuating it.”