62 N.Y.2d 19 (1984)
RPAPL 753(4) grants residential tenants a statutory right to cure lease violations within ten days after a court determination in a summary proceeding, potentially limiting the need for a Yellowstone injunction.
Summary
This case addresses the interplay between Yellowstone injunctions and RPAPL 753(4), which provides residential tenants in New York City a ten-day stay to cure lease violations after an adverse judgment in a summary proceeding. The plaintiff, a psychiatrist, sought a Yellowstone injunction to prevent the termination of his lease based on alleged violations of residential use covenants. The court considered whether the newly enacted RPAPL 753(4) negated the need for a Yellowstone injunction. The Court of Appeals held that RPAPL 753(4) effectively allows Civil Court to impose a permanent injunction barring forfeiture of the lease if the tenant cures within the statutory period, but remitted the case to determine if the tenant could obtain complete relief in Civil Court.
Facts
The plaintiff, a psychiatrist, used his residential apartment to see patients after vacating his private office.
The defendant landlord sent notices to the plaintiff asserting that this use violated the lease’s residential use clause. The landlord subsequently issued a notice of termination of the lease if the violation wasn’t cured by a specific date. Before the cure period expired, the plaintiff initiated a Supreme Court action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the lease termination.
Procedural History
The plaintiff obtained a temporary restraining order in Supreme Court.
The defendant cross-moved to dismiss the complaint.
The Supreme Court denied the defendant’s motion and granted the plaintiff a Yellowstone preliminary injunction.
The Appellate Division affirmed, considering RPAPL 753(4), but differed on whether the violation could be cured within the statute’s ten-day period.
The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether RPAPL 753(4) eliminates the need for a Yellowstone injunction by providing sufficient protection to tenants facing lease termination for alleged violations?
Holding
No, not necessarily. The Court of Appeals reversed and remitted the matter. While RPAPL 753(4) provides a mechanism for tenants to cure lease violations after a determination in Civil Court, the statute’s applicability depends on whether the tenant can obtain complete relief in Civil Court. If the tenant cannot obtain complete relief in Civil Court, the jurisdiction of Supreme Court is still available because “the tenant is unable to make the necessary showing to invoke the equitable powers of Supreme Court.”
Court’s Reasoning
The court reasoned that RPAPL 753(4) was intended to provide tenants with an opportunity to cure lease violations even after a court determination, effectively granting them what a Yellowstone injunction would provide. The Court of Appeals interpreted RPAPL 753(4) as “impressing its terms on residential leases and, in effect, authorizing Civil Court at the conclusion of summary proceedings to impose a permanent injunction in favor of the tenant barring forfeiture of the lease for the violation in dispute if the tenant cures within 10 days.” The court acknowledged that this interpretation limits the holding in First Nat. Stores v Yellowstone Shopping Center, where failure to obtain a stay resulted in lease termination. The court emphasized the policy benefits of resolving landlord-tenant disputes in Civil Court, and avoiding the delays associated with Supreme Court actions and pretrial proceedings. However, the court clarified that Supreme Court jurisdiction remains available if the tenant cannot obtain complete relief in Civil Court. Because the facts regarding the curability of the violation within ten days were not fully developed, the court remitted the case to Supreme Court for further proceedings. The court also cited the general rule that “a court applies the law as it exists at the time of appeal, not as it existed at the time of the original determination.”