Etra v. Matta, 61 N.Y.2d 455 (1984): Establishing Personal Jurisdiction Over Non-Resident Physicians

Etra v. Matta, 61 N.Y.2d 455 (1984)

A non-resident physician’s limited contacts with New York, such as consulting with a New York physician and providing an experimental drug as part of treatment initiated outside New York, are insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction in a New York medical malpractice suit.

Summary

This case addresses the limits of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident physician in a medical malpractice action. The New York Court of Appeals held that a Massachusetts physician, Dr. Lown, who treated a patient in Massachusetts and consulted with a New York physician after the patient returned to New York, did not have sufficient contacts with New York to warrant the exercise of personal jurisdiction. The court reasoned that Dr. Lown’s actions, including providing an experimental drug and consulting with the New York doctor, were incidental to the treatment initiated in Massachusetts and did not constitute transacting business in New York.

Facts

Plaintiffs’ decedent sought treatment from Dr. Lown in Massachusetts for a heart condition. Dr. Lown prescribed an experimental drug, Aprindine. After discharge, the patient returned to New York and was treated by Dr. Matta, a New York physician, to whom Dr. Lown referred the patient. Dr. Lown continued to consult with Dr. Matta via phone and letter regarding the Aprindine regimen and allegedly sent an additional supply of the drug to the patient in New York. The patient was later admitted to a New York hospital and died shortly after Aprindine treatment was discontinued.

Procedural History

Plaintiffs sued Dr. Matta and the drug manufacturer in New York, alleging that the decedent’s death was caused by a side effect of Aprindine. Dr. Matta impleaded Dr. Lown, alleging Dr. Lown failed to inform him of the drug’s precise side effects. Dr. Lown moved to dismiss the third-party complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Appellate Division agreed with Dr. Lown. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, finding no basis for personal jurisdiction over Dr. Lown in New York.

Issue(s)

Whether Dr. Lown’s contacts with New York, including consulting with Dr. Matta and providing Aprindine, constitute transacting business within the state under CPLR 302(a)(1), thus subjecting him to personal jurisdiction in New York. Whether Dr. Lown contracted to supply goods or services in New York, within the meaning of CPLR 302(a)(1), subjecting him to personal jurisdiction in New York.

Holding

No, because Dr. Lown’s contacts were insubstantial and did not amount to transacting business within New York as contemplated by CPLR 302(a)(1). No, because the provision of Aprindine was incidental to medical treatment rendered primarily in Massachusetts and was not the type of transaction the legislature intended to cover under CPLR 302(a)(1).

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that Dr. Lown’s contacts with New York were insufficient to constitute a transaction of business within the state. The court emphasized that Dr. Lown had referred the patient to a New York physician, and his subsequent communications and provision of the drug were merely consultative. The court cited McGowan v Smith, 52 NY2d 268 and Rothschild, Unterberg, Towbin v McTamney, 89 AD2d 540, affd 59 NY2d 651, to support the principle that the contacts must be substantial to warrant subjecting a non-domiciliary to suit in New York. Regarding the supply of Aprindine, the court stated that the amendment to CPLR 302(a)(1) was “not meant, in our view, to cover a transaction of this nature…The incidental provision of a drug, as part of a course of treatment rendered in another State, cannot be said to fall within the contemplation of the statute so as to confer personal jurisdiction over the physician.” The court focused on the limited nature of Dr. Lown’s involvement in New York, emphasizing that the primary treatment occurred in Massachusetts, and his subsequent actions were merely ancillary to that treatment. The court implied that allowing jurisdiction in such a case would unduly burden physicians who treat patients from other states.