People v. Charles, 61 N.Y.2d 321 (1984)
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A public servant can be guilty of bribe receiving even if the act requested by the bribe is technically beyond their official powers, as long as it relates to their official position and the briber seeks to influence their judgment or action in that capacity.
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Summary
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Charles, a court clerk, was convicted of bribe receiving for accepting money from an undercover agent posing as a taxi driver to dismiss a traffic ticket. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that even though Charles lacked the official power to dismiss the ticket, he could still be guilty of bribe receiving because the bribe was offered to influence his actions in his capacity as a court clerk, a matter to which he bears some official relation. The court also held that a variance between the indictment (charging solicitation, agreement, and acceptance of a bribe) and the jury charge (requiring only one of those elements) was not prejudicial error.
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Facts
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James Villafana, an undercover agent, approached Charles, a court clerk, with several traffic summonses. Charles stated that one ticket for driving an uninsured vehicle would result in a minimum fine and license revocation. Charles told Villafana he could get the uninsured ticket dismissed for $100. Villafana agreed, and Charles took him to a restroom, instructed him on how to plead, and allegedly accepted the $100. The uninsured ticket was dismissed, but not due to Charles’s actions; it was facially invalid because Villafana did not own the uninsured vehicle.
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Procedural History
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Charles was convicted of bribe receiving in the second degree after two prior trials resulted in hung juries. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Charles appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
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Issue(s)
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1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that the bribe was offered to affect Charles’s judgment or action “as a public servant,” given that he lacked the authority to dismiss the traffic ticket.
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2. Whether the conviction must be reversed because of a variation between the definition of the crime in the court’s charge (solicitation *or* agreement *or* acceptance) and the language in the indictment (solicitation *and* agreement *and* acceptance).
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Holding
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1. Yes, because the briber sought to affect Charles’s judgment or action in his capacity as a public servant and within the “colorable” authority of his position.
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2. No, because the variance did not prejudice Charles, nor did it usurp the Grand Jury’s power or violate double jeopardy protections.
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Court’s Reasoning
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The Court reasoned that the statute prohibiting bribe receiving requires only an agreement or understanding that the public servant’s action will be influenced; it doesn’t require the public servant to actually have the power to carry out the agreed-upon action. The court cited People v. Lafaro, 250 NY 336, 342, stating that “colorable” authority exists when a bribe is offered to a public official “to act corruptly in a matter to which he bears some official relation, though the act itself may be technically beyond his official powers or duties”. As a court clerk, Charles bore an official relation to the matter of traffic tickets, and the bribe was intended to influence his actions in that capacity.
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Regarding the jury instructions, the Court acknowledged that an indictment must provide fair notice, ensure the crime tried is the same as intended by the Grand Jury, and protect against double jeopardy. However, using the conjunctive