People v. J.K., 62 N.Y.2d 895 (1984)
A mandatory surcharge cannot be imposed upon a defendant who receives a youthful offender adjudication because such an adjudication is not a judgment of conviction.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a mandatory penalty assessment (now a surcharge) can be imposed following a youthful offender adjudication. The court held that it cannot. Because a youthful offender adjudication is not a judgment of conviction under New York Criminal Procedure Law, the plain meaning of the statute mandating the surcharge upon conviction for felonies, misdemeanors, or violations does not apply. The court reasoned that vacating the conviction and replacing it with a youthful offender finding has the practical and legal effect of a reversal, precluding the penalty assessment.
Facts
The facts of the underlying criminal offense are not specified in the opinion. The salient fact is that the defendant, J.K., was given youthful offender status.
Procedural History
The County Court ordered the imposition of a penalty assessment. The Court of Appeals reviewed the order, modifying it to vacate the penalty assessment and affirming the order as modified.
Issue(s)
Whether a mandatory penalty assessment (now a surcharge) can be imposed upon a defendant who receives a youthful offender adjudication, given that a youthful offender adjudication is not considered a judgment of conviction under New York law?
Holding
No, because a youthful offender adjudication is not a judgment of conviction; therefore, the statute mandating a surcharge upon conviction does not apply. Additionally, the vacatur of the conviction mandated by a youthful offender finding has the practical and legal effect of a reversal, which precludes the imposition of a penalty assessment.
Court’s Reasoning
The court’s reasoning centered on the interpretation of two key provisions of New York law: Penal Law § 60.35(1), which mandates a penalty assessment upon conviction for a felony, misdemeanor, or violation, and CPL § 720.35(1), which states that a youthful offender adjudication is not a judgment of conviction. The court applied the principle that when statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it must be given its plain meaning. Since a youthful offender adjudication is explicitly not a conviction, the mandatory surcharge provision does not apply. The court further reasoned that CPL 720.20(3) requires the conviction to be vacated when a youthful offender adjudication is made. Since Penal Law § 60.35(4) allows for a refund of the surcharge if the conviction is reversed, and the vacatur of the conviction pursuant to CPL 720.20(3) has “the practical and legal effect of a reversal,” the court concluded that imposing the surcharge in the first place would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme. The court cited People v. Gruber, 118 Misc.2d 363, for further support of this conclusion. The Court emphasized the plain language of the statute, stating, “When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the court is constrained to give effect to the plain meaning of the statute’s words.”