People v. Worley, 66 N.Y.2d 523 (1985)
When a defendant makes pretrial motions on the eve of trial, the period during which the court considers those motions is excluded from the time charged to the prosecution for speedy trial purposes.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Term’s order and denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. The court held that the prosecution should not be charged for delays resulting from the defendant’s pretrial motions made just before scheduled trial dates, particularly when the prosecution was ready to proceed. Additionally, the time the court spent considering the defendant’s motion to reconsider should also be excluded from the time charged to the prosecution. The court determined that the chargeable time to the People was less than the statutory limit.
Facts
The defendant was charged with driving while intoxicated (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192[2]). During the proceedings, the defendant filed several pretrial motions, often just before scheduled trial dates. The trial court took these motions under advisement, which necessarily adjourned the trial dates. After deciding the motions, the court set new trial dates. The defendant later moved to dismiss the charges based on a violation of his speedy trial rights under CPL 30.30.
Procedural History
The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, charging the People with the delay from the court’s decision on the prior motions until the newly scheduled trial date. The Appellate Term affirmed this decision. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
1. Whether the time during which the trial court considered the defendant’s pretrial motions, made on the eve of previously scheduled trial dates, should be charged to the People for speedy trial purposes.
2. Whether the time during which the trial court considered the defendant’s motion to reconsider a prior decision should be charged to the People for speedy trial purposes.
Holding
1. No, because the District Attorney had indicated readiness to proceed on the scheduled dates, the court should not have charged them with the delay following the defendant’s motions.
2. No, because the period during which the court held under advisement the defendant’s motion to reconsider should have been excluded from the time charged to the People.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the delays were primarily attributable to the defendant’s actions. Citing People v. Brothers, 50 N.Y.2d 413 and People v. Hamilton, 46 N.Y.2d 932, the court emphasized that the prosecution should not be penalized for delays caused by the defendant’s pretrial motions, especially when the prosecution was ready to proceed on the initially scheduled trial dates.
The court stated, “Inasmuch as the District Attorney had indicated his readiness to proceed on the scheduled dates, the court should not have charged him with the delay following defendant’s motions.” Further, the court clarified that the entire 30-day period between December 6, 1982, and January 5, 1983, should not have been charged to the People, as the court was considering the defendant’s motion to reconsider its prior decision for a portion of that time (from December 14 until January 5). This period should have been excluded.
By excluding the periods of delay attributable to the defendant’s motions, the court calculated that the People were only responsible for 66 days of delay, which was within the permissible time frame under CPL 30.30. Therefore, the defendant’s motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds should have been denied.