Giblin v. Nassau County Medical Center, 61 N.Y.2d 69 (1984)
The Statute of Limitations for municipal tort liability is tolled while a plaintiff’s application for permission to file a late notice of claim is pending, even after the 1976 amendment to General Municipal Law § 50-e.
Summary
This case addresses whether the Statute of Limitations is tolled when a plaintiff applies for permission to file a late notice of claim against a municipality. The Court of Appeals held that the Statute of Limitations is indeed tolled during the pendency of such an application. This ruling reaffirms the principle established in Barchet v. New York City Transit Authority, despite a 1976 amendment to General Municipal Law § 50-e. The amendment, which allowed late notice applications even after an action’s commencement, did not eliminate the statutory impediments to suit that prevent proper commencement until permission to file a late notice is granted.
Facts
In Giblin, Martin Giblin was treated at Nassau Medical Center on November 16, 1980, for a wrist injury. He applied for permission to file a late notice of claim against the county and the Medical Center on August 13, 1981, alleging he discovered a fracture in June 1981 that was initially treated as a sprain. The motion was granted on September 15, 1981, and the notice of claim was filed soon after. However, the summons and complaint were not served until March 4, 1982.
In Davis, Glen Davis was injured on May 17, 1980, falling between subway cars. He applied for leave to file a late notice of claim against the New York City Transit Authority on December 29, 1980. The motion was granted on March 25, 1981, and his notice of claim was deemed served. He commenced the action by serving the summons and complaint on October 1, 1981.
Procedural History
In Giblin, the Supreme Court, Nassau County, denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding the Statute of Limitations was tolled during the application for leave to file a late notice of claim. The Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed and dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff appealed based on the reversal.
In Davis, the Supreme Court, Kings County, denied the motion to dismiss and granted the cross-motion, relying on Barchet. The Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed, citing its decision in Giblin as dispositive. Plaintiff appealed based on the reversal.
Issue(s)
Whether the Statute of Limitations for municipal tort liability is tolled while a plaintiff’s application for permission to file a late notice of claim is pending, considering the 1976 amendment to General Municipal Law § 50-e.
Holding
Yes, because the 1976 amendment did not eliminate the statutory impediments to suit that prevent a plaintiff from properly commencing an action until permission to file a late notice of claim is granted. Therefore, the rationale of Barchet still applies, and CPLR 204(a) tolls the Statute of Limitations during the pendency of the motion.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the 1976 amendment to General Municipal Law § 50-e, which allows for late notice of claim applications to be made even after an action has commenced, did not fully eliminate the need for the Barchet rule. Prior to the amendment, a plaintiff was effectively prohibited from commencing an action until the court granted permission to file a late notice of claim. The amendment only removed the obstacle of applying for late notice after commencing an action, but it did not alter the underlying requirement that a notice of claim must be served and that a specified period must elapse before suit can be brought. The court emphasized that these requirements still function as conditions precedent to suit. As stated in the opinion, these requirements do not “specifically proscribe the prosecution of the action * * * they prescribe procedures which have the same effect”. Because statutory impediments to commencing the action remained, the Court found the Barchet rationale still valid and CPLR 204(a) should toll the Statute of Limitations. The Court also reviewed the legislative history of the amendment, finding it supported the conclusion that the amendment was not intended to abolish the Barchet rule. The court disagreed with the Appellate Division’s reliance on Corey v. County of Rensselaer, noting that the Corey decision failed to acknowledge the Barchet decision. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s orders and reinstated the Supreme Court’s orders in both the Giblin and Davis cases, affirming the tolling of the Statute of Limitations during the application process.