Feinberg v. Saks & Co., 56 N.Y.2d 206 (1982)
For a malicious prosecution claim to succeed, the plaintiff must demonstrate that probable cause, which existed at the time of arrest, had dissipated by the time the criminal proceeding was instituted.
Summary
Feinberg sued for false arrest and malicious prosecution. The jury found for the City on the false arrest claim but for Feinberg on the malicious prosecution claim. The Appellate Division reversed, finding inconsistent verdicts. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the malicious prosecution claim, holding that there was no evidence that the police lacked probable cause to prosecute Feinberg at the time of arraignment. The Court emphasized that a malicious prosecution claim requires a showing that the initial probable cause had dissipated by the time the criminal proceedings began, which Feinberg failed to demonstrate.
Facts
A 15-year-old runaway identified Feinberg as one of three men who abducted, raped, and forced her into prostitution. Feinberg was arrested on January 16, 1978, on charges including endangering the welfare of a child, unlawfully dealing with a child, criminal facilitation, and sexual abuse. Feinberg asserted an alibi at the time of his arrest. He was arraigned on January 17, 1978. The case was dismissed after the complaining witness failed to appear.
Procedural History
Feinberg sued the City of New York for false arrest and malicious prosecution. The jury found for the City on the false arrest claim but for Feinberg on the malicious prosecution claim and awarded damages. The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the complaint, citing inconsistent verdicts. The Court of Appeals reviewed the dismissal, treating the Appellate Division’s decision as an exercise of discretion, and affirmed the dismissal of the malicious prosecution claim.
Issue(s)
Whether the dismissal of the malicious prosecution claim was proper, specifically whether there was no evidence at trial that the police, between the time of detention and the time of instituting the criminal proceeding against the plaintiff, had knowledge of some intervening fact exonerating plaintiff.
Holding
No, because there was no evidence presented from which the jury could reasonably infer that probable cause, which existed at the time of arrest, had dissipated by the time of arraignment. The asserted alibi was indefinite and insubstantial, and the complainant’s identification of Feinberg remained.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals focused on whether the Appellate Division properly dismissed the malicious prosecution claim. The court stated that dismissal was proper only if “there was no evidence at trial that the defendant, between the time of detention and the time of instituting the criminal proceeding against the plaintiff, had knowledge of some intervening fact exonerating plaintiff.” The court emphasized that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the initial probable cause had dissipated by the time the criminal proceedings were initiated. The Court found Feinberg’s alibi to be “indefinite and insubstantial,” and given the complainant’s identification, there was no basis for the jury to infer malice. The Court noted that absent a showing that the police gained knowledge of facts exonerating Feinberg between the arrest and arraignment, the malicious prosecution claim must fail. The court effectively highlights the burden a plaintiff faces in demonstrating a lack of probable cause at the time the criminal proceeding commences, even if probable cause existed at the time of arrest.