People v. Moquin, 77 N.Y.2d 449 (1991)
Once a sentence has commenced, a court lacks the authority to vacate an illegally accepted plea and reinstate the original charges at the prosecutor’s request, unless there is statutory authorization or the error is a clerical one apparent on the record.
Summary
Moquin was charged with felony offenses, including robbery and firearm possession. The prosecutor reduced the charges to misdemeanors, and the court accepted Moquin’s guilty plea to petit larceny, sentencing him to nine months. Two weeks later, the prosecution moved to vacate the conviction, arguing that the charge reduction violated CPL 180.50. The court granted the motion and reinstated the original felony charges. Moquin then commenced an Article 78 proceeding to prohibit further prosecution on the felony charges and to reinstate his original plea and sentence. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that after a sentence has commenced, a court lacks the power to vacate an illegally accepted plea and reinstate original charges at the prosecutor’s request without statutory authority.
Facts
Moquin was arrested and arraigned on felony charges of first-degree robbery and criminal use of a firearm. The felony complaint alleged that Moquin, acting with another, forcibly stole property from a victim while displaying what appeared to be a handgun. The prosecutor moved to reduce the charges to the misdemeanor offenses of petit larceny and fourth-degree weapon possession. The court accepted Moquin’s guilty plea to petit larceny. Moquin was immediately sentenced to nine months in jail and began serving his sentence.
Procedural History
The People moved to vacate Moquin’s conviction two weeks after sentencing, arguing the charge reduction violated CPL 180.50. The trial court granted the motion, reinstating the original felony charges. Moquin initiated an Article 78 proceeding to prohibit further prosecution on the felony charges and reinstate his original plea/sentence. The trial court denied the application, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals then reversed the lower courts.
Issue(s)
Whether a court, after a sentence has commenced, has the authority to vacate an illegally accepted plea and reinstate the original charges at the prosecutor’s request, in the absence of statutory authorization.
Holding
No, because there is no statutory authorization for the court to vacate the plea and sentence at the prosecutor’s request and reinstate the original charges after the sentence has commenced. The court’s inherent power to correct its own errors does not extend to vacating a plea and sentence over the defendant’s objection when the error goes beyond a clerical error apparent on the record.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals found no statutory basis for the trial court’s vacatur of the plea. CPL 440.10(1)(a) allows a court to vacate a judgment only on the defendant’s motion, and CPL 440.40(1) permits the court to vacate a sentence for illegality on the People’s motion within one year, but it does not allow the court to set aside the plea and reinstate original charges. Further, CPL 440.40(5) states that an order entered pursuant to the People’s motion “does not affect the validity or status of the underlying conviction.”
While recognizing a court’s inherent power to correct its own errors (citing People v. Minaya and People v. Wright), the Court distinguished those cases, emphasizing that those corrections involved clerical errors apparent on the record. The court noted that, “In no instance have we recognized a court’s inherent power to vacate a plea and sentence over defendant’s objection where the error goes beyond mere clerical error apparent on the face of the record and where the proceeding has terminated by the entry of judgment.”
The Court reasoned that the Legislature has expressed its intent to place a time limit on the People’s right to challenge an illegal judgment through CPL 440.40(1), which would be undermined by an undefined inherent power to correct errors not apparent in the record. Since there was no basis for the vacatur, the original plea and sentence were reinstated, and further prosecution on the original felony charges was barred by double jeopardy.