Matter of Margiotta, 60 N.Y.2d 147 (1983)
For attorney disbarment purposes, a federal felony conviction warrants automatic disbarment in New York if it is ‘essentially similar’ to a New York felony, focusing on the protection of the public and the inherent coercion in actions taken under color of official right.
Summary
This case concerns the automatic disbarment of an attorney, Margiotta, following a federal felony conviction for mail fraud and extortion under the Hobbs Act. The New York Court of Appeals considered whether the federal crimes were “essentially similar” to a New York felony, specifically larceny by extortion. The court affirmed the disbarment, holding that extortion under color of official right, even without explicitly instilling fear, is essentially similar to the New York crime, emphasizing the coercive nature of public office. This decision highlights the court’s focus on protecting the public and maintaining the integrity of the legal profession.
Facts
Margiotta, an attorney admitted to the New York Bar, was convicted in federal court of mail fraud and extortion under the Hobbs Act. The Hobbs Act convictions involved unlawfully affecting commerce by extortion. Following the conviction, the Appellate Division automatically disbarred Margiotta under Section 90(4) of the Judiciary Law. Margiotta appealed, arguing his federal conviction lacked a New York analogue, entitling him to a mitigation hearing.
Procedural History
The Appellate Division concluded Margiotta’s Hobbs Act violation was essentially similar to New York’s felony of larceny by extortion, warranting automatic disbarment. Margiotta appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, upholding the automatic disbarment.
Issue(s)
Whether a federal felony conviction under the Hobbs Act for obtaining property “under color of official right” is essentially similar to the New York felony of larceny by extortion, even if the federal conviction does not require proof of instilling fear in the victim.
Holding
Yes, because for purposes of attorney disbarment under Judiciary Law § 90(4), obtaining property “under color of official right” pursuant to the Hobbs Act is essentially similar to larceny by extortion under New York Penal Law § 155.05(2)(e), as the coercive element is implied from the public official’s position of authority.
Court’s Reasoning
The court reasoned that while the Hobbs Act allows for conviction based on either instilling fear or acting under color of official right, the latter is essentially similar to the New York crime. The court emphasized that disciplinary proceedings aim to protect the public, differing from criminal sentencing’s focus on individual punishment. It stated, “the perspective with which the sentencing of convicted criminals is approached — the imposition of individual punishment — is quite different from that involved in professional disciplinary proceedings — the protection of the public.” The court noted that the “color of official right” element in the Hobbs Act reflects the common-law understanding that extortion by a public official inherently involves coercion. Quoting United States v Williams, 621 F.2d 123, 124, the court stated that “[t]he language, ‘under color of official right,’ is consonant with the common law definition of extortion, which could be committed only by a public official taking a fee under color of his office, with no proof of threat, force or duress required.” The court concluded that the coercive element is supplied by the existence of the public office itself. Chief Judge Cooke dissented, arguing the “essential similarity” test lacks a cognizable standard and advocated for a hearing to ensure fairness.