People v. Rivera, 60 N.Y.2d 110 (1983)
A subsequent prosecution for homicide is permissible, despite double jeopardy concerns, when the victim dies after the initial prosecution for assault or another offense resulting in physical injury, provided the death results from the same physical injury.
Summary
Rivera was initially convicted of reckless endangerment and criminal possession of a weapon for beating Fonseca. Fonseca died nearly four years later, and Rivera was then charged with depraved mind murder. Rivera argued the second prosecution was barred by double jeopardy. The Court of Appeals held that the delayed death exception to double jeopardy, as codified in CPL 40.20(2)(d), permitted the murder prosecution. The court reasoned that the death, a supervening fact, created a new offense not chargeable originally. The initial prosecution and the subsequent murder prosecution are for different crimes because death is an essential element of murder not present in the earlier charges.
Facts
Rivera and a codefendant beat Felix Fonseca with pipes, causing Fonseca to lapse into a coma.
Rivera was indicted for attempted murder, assault, reckless endangerment, and criminal possession of a weapon.
The attempted murder charge was dismissed, and Rivera was acquitted of intentional assault but convicted of reckless endangerment and criminal possession of a weapon.
Nearly four years later, Fonseca died as a result of the injuries sustained in the beating.
Rivera was then indicted for depraved mind murder.
Procedural History
The trial court dismissed the murder indictment, finding the crimes were substantially the same offense and that mandatory joinder provisions were violated.
The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s order and reinstated the indictment.
The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether a subsequent prosecution for murder is permissible when the victim dies after the initial prosecution for assault or another offense resulting in physical injury, based on the delayed death exception to double jeopardy?
Holding
Yes, because the delayed death exception to double jeopardy, as codified in CPL 40.20(2)(d), permits a subsequent prosecution for homicide when the victim dies after the initial prosecution for assault or another offense resulting in physical injury, provided the death results from the same physical injury.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 40.20(2)(d) provides an exception to the general rule against double jeopardy for cases of delayed death. The court stated, “It is impossible to prosecute anyone for homicide until the victim is dead and death which occurs subsequent to trial of one of the offenses within the reach of the statute is a supervening fact which creates a new offense which was not chargeable originally.”
The court rejected Rivera’s argument that the exception only applies when the earlier prosecution results in a conviction for assault, stating that the statute applies to “assault or some other offense resulting in physical injury.” The court emphasized that the rationale is the two prosecutions are for different crimes, since death is a necessary element of homicide. As the court stated, “the principal element of death distinguished them. Indeed, the homicide offense was not consummated and subject to prosecution until the moment of death.”
The court also rejected Rivera’s collateral estoppel argument, stating that the jury’s acquittal on the intentional assault charge could have been based on the different mens rea requirements, not on a finding that Rivera did not cause physical injury. Finally, the court dismissed Rivera’s argument regarding mandatory joinder, noting that he was charged with murder, not reckless assault, and that the murder charge was not possible at the time of the initial prosecution because the victim had not yet died.
The court concluded, “Thus, the only factor distinguishing the depraved mind murder prosecution from the prior charge of reckless endangerment, was the delayed death. The statutory exception was designed to encompass that event, and it applies here.”