300 West 49th St. Assocs. v. Schmidt, 60 N.Y.2d 163 (1983)
An individual who assists others in filing official complaints does not receive absolute privilege from defamation liability; rather, such activities are protected by a qualified privilege which can be defeated by a showing of malice.
Summary
300 West 49th St. Assocs., a landlord, sued Aphrodite Schmidt, president of a tenants’ association, for libel based on statements in tenant applications filed with the State Division of Housing and Community Renewal. Schmidt assisted tenants in seeking rent overcharge refunds and treble damages. The Appellate Division dismissed the complaint, holding the statements were absolutely privileged due to the quasi-judicial nature of the proceedings. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that Schmidt, as an advisor and not a direct participant (attorney, party, or witness) in the proceedings, was not entitled to absolute privilege. Her actions were subject only to qualified privilege which required the landlord to prove malice.
Facts
300 West 49th St. Assocs. owned an apartment complex in East White Plains, New York.
Aphrodite Schmidt was a tenant and president of the Park Knoll Tenants’ Association.
Schmidt assisted tenants in preparing and filing applications with the State Division of Housing and Community Renewal alleging rent overcharges.
Ten tenant applications, containing statements accusing the landlord of legal and moral wrongs, were filed with the Division of Housing.
Seven applications stated that Schmidt prepared them, signing as president of the tenants’ association.
Three applications stated they were submitted with Schmidt’s assistance.
Procedural History
The landlord sued Schmidt for libel, alleging she defamed it in its trade and business.
The Appellate Division dismissed the complaint, holding the statements were absolutely privileged because they were made in a quasi-judicial proceeding.
The landlord appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether a tenant association leader who assists tenants in preparing and filing rent overcharge complaints with a state agency is entitled to absolute privilege from defamation claims arising from statements made in those complaints.
Holding
No, because the tenant association leader was neither an attorney, party, nor witness in a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, therefore she is not entitled to absolute immunity and may only claim a qualified privilege which can be defeated by proof of malice.
Court’s Reasoning
The court distinguished between absolute and qualified privileges in defamation law. Absolute privilege provides immunity regardless of motive, while qualified privilege can be lost if the defendant acted with malice.
Absolute privilege is based on the speaker’s official participation in government processes. The policy behind absolute privilege is to allow certain participants in government to perform their duties without fear of litigation.
Participants in judicial proceedings (judges, jurors, attorneys, parties, and witnesses) have absolute privilege for statements made “in office.” The court held that Schmidt did not hold an “office” in the proceedings.
“The immunity does not attach solely because the speaker is a Judge, attorney, party or a witness, but because the statements are, in the words of Lord Mansfield, ‘spoken in office.’”
The court declined to extend absolute privilege to Schmidt because she was merely a volunteer assisting tenants. Extending it further would grant immunity to any leader who encourages litigation.
The court reasoned that Schmidt’s activities were protected by a qualified privilege because her communications were made “in the discharge of some public or private duty, legal or moral, or in the conduct of [her] own affairs, in a matter where [her] interest is concerned.”
To overcome the qualified privilege, the landlord must prove that Schmidt acted with malice. The court found that the complaint contained sufficient allegations of malice to withstand a motion to dismiss.